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PERSPECTIVE

The O.J. Inquisition: A United States
Encounter With Continental Criminal
Justice
Myron Moskouitz*

Editor's Note**
October 3, 1995 marked the end of the O.J. Simpson double
murder trial, which lasted 474 days and was billed "the trial of the
century. " After less than four hours of deliberation, the jury
acquitted Mr. Simpson of all charges. The following article is a
dramatization of how a case similar to the Simpson trial might be
handled by a civil-law European criminal justice system.
Utilizing an unusual format, Professor Myron Moskovitz
examines and illustrates the differences between the United States
and civil-law European criminal justice systems. The author uses a
play script inspired by the events in the trial of O.J. Simpson, set
before a European Court.
The script consists of fictitious
conversations among a fictitious prosecutor, defense attorney,
officers of a mock European Court, and two professors. The
dialogue illustrates the differences between the two legal systems
and the historical and sociological premises that inform them.

*

Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. The author would like to
thank Professors Rudolph B. Schlesinger, MiIjan Damaska, Abraham S.
Goldstein, Richard S. Frase, Craig M. Bradley, Lloyd L. Weinreb, Bernard Segal,
Robert C. Calhoun and Joseph J. Darby for their helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article.
**
Due to the unusual format of Professor Moskovitz's academic
commentary, the Journal has chosen not to apply its standard conventions in
order to preserve the dramatic nature of the dialogue.
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News Item? Due to pervasive public criticism of the United
States "adversarial" criminal justice system, all parties have
agreed to try the double murder trial in a neutral European
nation, where the case will be handled under the "inquisitorial"
legal system. When asked if it would be difficult to adjust to a
new system in the short time remaining before trial, one of the
attorneys replied, "No problem. There's probably a few minor
differences between our systems, but we should be able to pick
them up as we go along."
Scene I: A courtroom in Europe. Ms. Clare and Professor
Schmrz sit at the prosecution table. Mr. Crane and Professor
Grbzyk sit at the defense table. At another table sit the victims'
families and their attorney, Ms. Smith. Behind the tables,
guarded by bailiffs, stands the Accused, and behind him is a
gallery packed with spectators. All face a long, raised bench.

Crane:

I must be nuts, letting you talk me into this.
What now? They put my client on the rack and
tum the screw 'til he talks?

Grbzyk:

(laughing) That went out in the 18th century.

You Americans have the wrong impression of
the inquisitorial system. It's probably the most
widely used legal system in the world today. It
was started by the Catholic Church, and after
the French Revolution, it was further developed
by the French and the Germans. It then spread
to the rest of Europe, except for the British
Isles. Many Mrican, South American, and Asian
countries have also adopted it. It's used much
more today than your Anglo-American
"adversarial" system. It'sCrane:

Can the lecture, Professor. Here they come.

Grbzyk:

(whispering) Straighten your robe.

Everyone stands. Nine people enter the courtroom from a
side door. Three of them, wearing black robes, take the three
center seats behind the bench. The other six wear red-and-white
sashes, and they take the other seats. The man in the middle

1.
To the author's lmowledge, no person living or dead has engaged in
any of the conversations that make up the dialogue of this perspective.
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dons a red beret, then places a large book in front of him and
opens it.
Presiding Judge: The People of the State of California versus Mr.
Sampson. Are counsel ready?
Clare:

Yes, your honor.

Crane:

(bowing) Ready, your majesty.

Smith:

Ready, your honor.

Clare:

Excuse me, your honor. I don't know who this
person is.

Smith:

I'm Sally Smith, attorney for the families of the
victims.

Clare:

What are you doing here? This is my case, a
criminal case, not a civil case. You don't belong
here.

Presiding Judge: Ms. Clare, we allow the alleged victim to
intervene and appear by counsel in our criminal
trials. Who has a greater interest in seeing that
justice is done than the victim?
Clare:

The State does, your honor. I represent the
State, she doesn't. That's how it's done in the
United States.

Presiding Judge: But you haven't always done it that way. As I
recall, in the early days of England and the
United States, a criminal prosecution was
usually brought by the victim, who also paid for
Only recently, with the development of
it.

public prosecutors like yourself, has the status
and the involvement of the victim withered
away.
Clare:

Maybe it's coming back. Some states now allow
victims to take part in sentencing hearings.

Presiding Judge: In any event, we go further here, at least in
trials of serious crimes. If the defendant is
convicted, he might even be ordered to pay
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damages to the victim. You, of course, do
represent the State, but the victim may also
appear by counsel. Now let's get to work. I will
call as the fIrst witness Crane:

Uh, excuse me, my lord.

Presiding Judge: Yes, Mr. Crane?
Crane:

We seem to be forgetting something.

Presiding Judge: Forgetting?
Crane:

Aren't we going to voir dire the jurors? You
know, ask them a few questions to see if they're
biased?
Bounce a few out on peremptory
challenges? That sort of thing. That comes
fIrst, doesn't it?

The Presiding Judge stares at Crane, then cracks up
laughing. The whole courtroom joins in-except for Crane and
Clare.
Presiding Judge: Very good joke, Mr. Crane. We will now call the
fIrst witness. Bailiffs, please bring the Accused
forward.
Crane:

The Accused? That-this man is
my client! The defendantl You can't make him
testify(sputtering)

Presiding Judge:

(annoyed) Sit down, Mr. Crane.

If you don't
understand our procedure, perhaps Professor
Grbzyk can enlighten you during a recess. Now,
Mr. Sampson, let me ask you-

Clare:

Excuse me, judge.

Presiding Judge: Now what? Yes, Ms. Clare?
Clare:

I believe it's the prosecution's duty to present
the state's case. So if you don't mind, I'll
question the witness.

Presiding Judge: (frowning, slamming down his gavel) We'll take a
recess, so our U.S. friends may better acquaint
themselves with continental procedure.
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Scene IT: A small cafe next to the courthouse. Crane and
Grbzyk sit at one table drinking coffee. Clare and Schrorz sit at
another table.

Crane:

What are these people, animals? They've never
heard of due process? No wonder they're always
going to war.
(Sipping some espresso and
making a face.) Bitter, bitter, bitter.

Grbzyk:

Sugar? Relax, Mr. Crane. You Americans didn't
invent civilization, you know. There's more than
one way to run a justice system.

Crane:

You call this justice? I can't even voir dire my
jurors.

Grbzyk:

They're not jurors, at least not in the u.S.
sense.

Crane:

Those six people without the robes. Judges or
jurors?

Grbzyk:

Jurors, sort of. They're called lay assessors.
They're ordinary people, like your jurors,
selected at random from the population. The
parties have no right to question them or to
remove any of them, so long as they meet our
minimal qualifications of age, citizenship, and
the like. You don't need to, really, because they
can't decide the case by themselves anyway.

Crane:

What do you mean?

Grbzyk:

The tribunal is a "mixed panel" of professional
judges-the three people in the robes-and the
lay assessors. The panel decides the case by a
two-thirds majority.

Crane:

Now just a minute. You're not telling me that
the judges go into a room with these lay
assessors and deliberate with them?

Grbzyk:

I'm afraid I am. You seem shocked.
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Crane:

Of course I'm shocked. What kind of a jury do
you have when judges vote with the jurors?

Grbzyk:

Well, the jurors-as you insist on calling
them-can outvote the judges. There are six
jurors and only three judges.

Crane:

Look, Professor, I wasn't born yesterday. Jurors
think judges walk on water.
When a
judge-when three judges-tell the jurors what
they think, what juror is going to disagree?

Grbzyk:

I concede that it does not occur very often.

Crane:

Why not get rid of the jurors and be done with
it? Be up front and let the judges decide the
case.

Grbzyk:

This does happen in minor cases. But in major
cases, we want some lay involvement. Also, we
have the lay people vote before the judges vote,
so the lay people will not be influenced by the
judges' votes.

Crane:

But they know what the judges think anyway
because they heard the judges during the prevote discussion.

Grbzyk:

I suppose this is so.

Crane:

Where does the judge instruct these lay
assessors on the law? In open court or behind
closed doors, in the deliberation room?

Grbzyk:

We have no formal jury instructions, as you do.
During deliberations, the judge will explain the
law to the assessors. I've seen your U.S. jury
instructions. They are usually in the language
of statutes or appellate court opinions. They
may be legally correct, but they're very difficult
for lay people to understand. Your judges are
reluctant to depart from them by even a single
word, for fear of reversal on appeal. In our
system, the judge explains the law to the
assessors in simple language. If they have

trouble getting it, the judge may discuss it with
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them informally until they understand. This all
happens in the deliberation room.
Crane:

Makes sense, I guess. I've often wondered how
much U.S. jurors really understand when the
judge reads them those long, legalistic
instructions. But in your system, the lawyers
have no idea what the judge is telling the jurors.
Suppose he makes a mistake? How would I ever
know about it?

Grbzyk:

After the tribunal decides the case, one of the
judges will write the judgment. It is not a
simple "guilty" or "not guilty" verdict, as you
have. It will spell out what law the tribunal
applied, in detail.

Crane:

But that's written after the tribunal already
voted.
Maybe the judge told the jurors
something different from what he wrote in the
judgment.

Grbzyk:

No European judge would do a thing like that,
Mr. Crane.

Crane:

You sure seem to trust these guys.

Grbzyk:

I suppose we do. It's good to get an outsider's
perspective on one's legal system, Mr. Crane.
Perhaps we can learn a lot from each other.

****
Clare:

I can't believe this. I schlepped all the way to
Europe, and I can't even question a witness?

Schmrz:

Madame must have patience.
come.

Clare:

Oh yeah? When? After the verdict?
case to try, isn't' it?

Schmrz:

Not exactly.
Do you understand why our
system is called "inquisitorial?"

Clare:

After the Spanish Inquisition?

Your tum will
It's my
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Schmrz:

No, Madame. We have become a bit more
civilized since then. It is inquisitorial because it
is based on the tribunal's duty to inquire, to
fmd the truth. In your adversarial system, the
parties are responsible for presenting the
evidence, pretty much in any way they see fit.
The judge merely makes sure that everyone
behaves, and the jury sits passively and listens.
When the lawyers are done, the jury decides.
Neither the jury nor the judge takes any active
part in investigating the case, seeking out
evidence, or otherwise fmding out what
happened. This is not so in the inquisitorial
system. Here, our judges are responsible for
fmding the truth themselves.

Clare:

Do they do that in civil cases too?

Schmrz:

No. Our method of litigating civil disputes is
different from yours, but it is built on the same
basic premise: the state has very little stake in
the outcome of civil litigation. In both Europe
and the United States, the state provides a
proper forum for the resolution of private
disputes, but it cares little about who wins a
particular case. True, the state establishes
substantive rules of law, in order to cause
certain results in society, and these rules are
enforced partly through private litigation. But
in a particular case, the state provides the
playing field and the umpire, that's all. For
example, if the parties choose to settle in the
middle of a case-even on that which might
seem unjust to an outsider-the judge will
seldom hesitate to terminate the litigation. If
the parties are satisfied, the state has no further
interest in the matter. This is so in both of our
systems. What seems odd to us, however, is
that in the United States you treat criminal
cases pretty much the same way, even though
the state clearly has an interest in seeing that
the guilty are convicted and the innocent are
freed. In Europe, we operate openly on this
principle. This is why the state inquires: the
state itself cares about the outcome.
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Clare:

So that's why the presiding judge does the
questioning?

Schmrz:

Yes. When he is done, you and Mr. Crane will
have a chance to ask additional questions.

Clare:

If there's anything left to ask about.

Schmrz:

I grant that this is unlikely, if the presiding
judge is thorough.

Clare:

This is ridiculous. Why am I even in the
courtroom? I might as well read a book or take
a nap.

Schmrz:

Our prosecutors have been known to do both,
on occasion.

Clare:

Look, Professor, you don't seem to realize what's
at stake for me here. This is my case. If I lose,

I'm back in Compton Muni Court prosecuting
parking tickets.
Schmrz:

Lose? I don't understand.

Clare:

What's to understand? Lose. You know, like
the Super Bowl or the World Series. If you win,
I lose.

Schmrz:

Ah, I see. The adversarial system is ·speaking.
But in our system, prosecutors never lose.

Clare:

Never lose? So the game is flXed?

Schmrz:

No. There is no "game." Prosecutors never lose,
but they never win, either. They simply don't
think in terms of winning or losing. If the
tribunal acquits the defendant, the prosecutor
feels no sense of having lost the case. He has
done his job, and the tribunal has done its job.
His responsibility is to assist the tribunal in
fmding a just result, not to "win."

Clare:

How "un-American."

Schmrz:

Quite so, I'm afraid.
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Clare:

But what about the prosecutor's career?
Doesn't he move up the ladder by winning his
cases?

Schmrz:

Our prosecutor is a civil servant, not a political
figure. He advances by faithfully performing his
duties. Whether the tribunal convicts or acquits
the defendant is of no consequence.

Clare:

It's certainly of consequence where I come from.
My community fears crime, and they want
convictions. If I don't get 'em, I'm out.

Schmrz:

You are employed by your community, is that
correct?

Clare:

Sure. The county board of supervisors pays my
salary.

Schmrz:

So naturally you must please them. But our
prosecutors do not work for local governments.
All are employed by our central government in
the capital. They are not unduly concerned
with the . ephemeral reactions of the
communities in which they happen to be based.
When a prosecutor is promoted, she will
probably be transferred to another city anyway.

Clare:

That certainly would affect how they see their
cases.

Schmrz:

Madame, you should stop thinking of "my case"
and "their cases." The case belongs to the
tribunal, not to the lawyers.

Clare:

.Very lofty, Professor, but let's get down to
practicalities. I question witnesses because I
know the case, backwards and forwards. I
investigated the case and I prepared for trial, so
I know what to ask and how to follow up
answers with more questions. The judge can't
do that, because he comes into court cold. He
doesn't know the case.

Schmrz:

This judge does.
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Clare:

How?

Schmrz:

Did you notice the large book the presiding
judge has been looking at?

Clare:

Yes. I thought it was a law book.

Schmrz:

Not quite. It is called a dossier. It contains the
report of the examining magistrate.

Clare:

Who's she?

Schmrz:

The examining magistrate is another judge, who
investigates the case before trial, after the police
have completed their investigation.
She
interviews all witnesses and writes reports on
what they said. She also sees that physical
evidence is gathered and any needed scientific
tests are performed. She then compiles all of
these documents into the dossier, which she
gives to the judge who will preside at the trial.
This is the French system. Some countries, like

Germany,

have eliminated the examining

magistrate, and the prosecutor prepares the
dossier.
Clare:

Hold on. You mean to tell me that before the
trial even begins, the judges and jurors have
read a whole report on the case?

Schmrz:

Not all of them. Just the presiding judge and
perhaps one other judge, who might be
responsible for writing the judgment.
The
presiding judge needs the dossier in order to
perform his job of questioning witnesses.

Clare:

But he votes, and he can influence the others
during deliberations. In the U.S. of A. we would
never tolerate a judge or juror who had read a
whole detailed report on the case before the trial
even began. I'm no bleeding heart liberal, mind
you, but even a slimeball criminal defendant is
entitled to a fact-fmder who hasn't already made
up his mind.
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Schmrz:

Perhaps we trust our judges more than you
trust yours.

Clare:

It's not just a matter of trust. It's a matter of
the limits of the human mind. While your
presiding judge is questioning the witnesses, he
is also supposed to be making up his mind on
how to vote. How can anyone do both at the
same time? Sure, he can throw out easy,
softball questions to witnesses. But sometimes
the best way to get to the truth is through
tough, hardball cross-examination. That's often
the best way to deal with a liar. How can a
judge do that and still be a neutral fact-fmder?
I couldn't do it, and I don't think you could
either. That's why it's better to have people like
me and Crane cross-examine. We can be as
tough or tricky as we want, and it doesn't
matter, because we don't decide the case.

Schmrz:

I see your point. Of course, keep in mind that

we do allow the attorneys to question a witness
when the presiding judge is done.
Clare:

So they do the cross-examining?

Schmrz:

Not in the way you describe. The presiding
judge usually does such a complete job that
there is little left to ask, and the attorneys don't
want to offend the judge by implying that he
was less than thorough. So at most, they might
ask a question or two, usually very politely.
Most of them have had little or no experience
with U.S.-style cross-examination.

Clare:

That must make it pretty easy for someone to lie
in your courts-and get away with it.

Schmrz:

The presiding judge is a very stern and
prestigious figure. One would not lightly lie to
him. And if the tribunal believes that the
defendant has lied, that might well affect the
sentence it imposes on the defendant.

Clare:

In the United States, it's probably a little easier
for a defendant to concoct a lie that sounds
plausible, because he doesn't testify until after
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he's heard the prosecution case. Here, he can't
do that, because he goes ftrst.
Schmrz:

He does go ftrst, but he is nevertheless familiar
with the prosecution case before he testiftes.
Before trial, we allow the defendant to see the
complete dossier, which contains summaries of
the testimony of each witness. Howeverf those
summaries might not be as detailed as the incourt testimony of witnesses, still yet to come.
So our defendants might be taking a chance by
inventing or embellishing stories.

Clare:

You let him see the whole dossier?

Schmrz:

We do. Both the prosecutor and the defense
counsel may examine the dossier before trial.
We believe in complete pre-trial discovery.
There are no secrets.

Clare:

Discovery is much more limited in the United
States. We don't want to give the defendant a
chance to adapt his story to what the
prosecution witnesses are going to say, and we
don't want him to intimidate or bribe
prosecution witnesses.

SChmrz:

But here the defendant has probably already
told his story to the examining magistrate, as
have the prosecution witnesses. They are not
likely to change their stories much at trial, and
if they do not appear, their written statements
may be considered anyway.

Clare:

Even though they're hearsay?

Schmrz:

Hearsay? What is that?

Clare:

Oh, boy. Toto, we're not in Kansas anymore.

****
Crane:

OK, Professor, I'm beginning to get a glimmer of

how your system works, though I can't say I like
it-yet. But how can they call the Accused as
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the ftrst witness? Don't you have any privilege
againstseli-tncrantnationhere?
Grbzyk:

In a way. After your client answers some
general questions about his background, the
presidtng judge will advise him that he has the
right not to answer questions about the crane
itseli. But defendants rarely assert that right.

Crane:

Why not? I've had a lot of clients I'd never put
on the stand. Why open them up to crossexamination and have their stories ripped
apart?

Grbzyk:

Remember, the presiding judge has read the
dossier. He knows there is evidence that the
defendant committed the crane, and he wants
the defendant's response.

Crane:

So he's presumed guilty, before the trial even
starts?

Grbzyk:

No. In former times, a conviction could be
based on the dossier alone. Today, however, the
tribunal may not convict the defendant unless
the evidence produced at the trial ftrmly
convtnces the tribunal that the defendant is
guilty. But let's be practical. The person who
prepared the dossier-the examtning magistrate
or the prosecutor-is an experienced, unbiased
government official. If she has determined that
there is sufficient evidence to go forward with
the trial, everyone knows there is a good chance
the defendant is guilty. In the United States,
you like to pretend otherwise, but that's just
pretense, isn't it?

Crane:

Well, maybe it is. I've always wondered if jurors
really follow the judge's tnstruction to give no
weight to the fact that the police have arrested
the defendant and the prosecutor has brought
the case to trial. I guess it's what you might call
a "useful ftction."

Grbzyk:

We believe tn honesty.
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Crane:

Hmm. Before you get too cocky, Professor,
answer this, if you will. Suppose I tell my client
just to clam up when the judge questions him
about the crime?

Grbzyk:

If the defendant fails to respond, the judge will
assume the worst. And the defendant knows it.

Crane:

But that's using the defendant's silence against
him. We don't allow that, at least not openly.

Grbzyk:

We do. Who knows more about the crime than
the defendant, and what -good is served by his
silence? In any event, there's another reason
for him to talk.

Crane:

Which is?

Grbzyk:

In your system, the trial is about guilt, and only
about guilt. Sentencing comes later. We don't
do it that way. Our trials are about both guilt

and sentencing.

If the tribunal fmds the

defendant guilty, the judgment will also contain
the sentence. So the presiding judge must
develop evidence not only about whether the
defendant committed the crime, but also about
what sentence he deserves if he did it.
Crane:

You're kidding! You mean that evidence about
his prior record, his whole life-everything we
consider in sentencin~omes in at his triar?

Grbzyk:

Quite correct. Does that bother you?

Crane:

Bother me? No, it kills me. How can you give a
guy a fair trial on whether he committed this
crime when you know that he has four priors,
went AWOL from the Army, and stole two bits
from the church collection box when he was a
kid? In the United States, we call this stuff
irrelevant and prejudicial and keep it out of the
trial.

Grbzyk:

I suppose we trust our tribunal more than you
trust yours. With our judges deliberating along
with the lay assessors, the judges will make
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sure that the assessors do not draw any
improper inferences.
Crane:

Yeah, I bet. Anyway, I see your point. At a U.S.
sentencing hearing, it is better for the defendant
to talk. He's already been found guilty, and if
he won't cooperate now, the judge is likely to
throw the book at him. If you guys combine
guilt and sentencing into one trial, I have only
one shot at showing the tribunal that the
defendant isn't such a bad guy, so I'd better tell
him to answer the judge's questions.

Grbzyk:

You're learning fast, Mr. Crane.

Crane:

I guess there's another reason to have him
testify, or maybe a reason not to have him not
testify. In the United States, if I allow my client
to testify, the D.A. can then introduce his prior
felony convictions to show that he's not a very

credible witness. The judge will tell the jury not
to think he's committed this crime just because
he committed the priors, but I don't think most
jurors can draw such fme lines. So lots of times
I don't put him on the stand just because I don't
want the jury to hear about the priors. Over
here, the tribunal will hear about the priors
anyway, whether he testifies or not. So I might
as well put him on.
Grbzyk:

Very astute. I hadn't thought of that.

Crane:

Still, it doesn't seem fair to put a defendant in a
position where he has to hang himself by
talking. And if they think he's lying, they can
try to nail him for peIjury.

Grbzyk:

That cannot happen.

Crane:

You don't prosecute people for lying under oath?

Grbzyk:

We do. But the accused is never put under
oath. We want his testimony, but we feel that
the threat of peIjury would unfairly put too
much pressure on him.
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Crane:

(shaking his head) Weird. You people are really
weird.

Grbzyk:

Perhaps when you see how all the pieces fit
together, we will seem less weird.

Crane:

What about be/ore the trial? Can the police or
the examining magistrate question the
defendant, get a confession out of him, and then
use it at the trial?

Grbzyk:

Generally, yes. But whenever a suspect is to be
questioned, he must first be advised of his right
to silence and his right to counsel.

Crane:

Sounds familiar.

Grbzyk:

It should. Some countries have explicitly based
these requirements on your Miranda2 decision.

Crane:

Interesting. I've seen a few U.S. decisions cite
European practices as authority for some new
idea, but it's pretty rare.

Grbzyk:

It should be rare. It's a dangerous thing to do.
One shouldn't graft a feature from a different
system until one fully comprehends how the
entire system supports that feature.

Crane:

I'm not sure I get what you're saying.

Grbzyk:

You will, as you learn more about our system.

Crane:

So, do your defendants exercise their Miranda
rights, or do they waive them?

Grbzyk:

Before the police, they often waive them, as do
your defendants.
But when the examining
magistrate questions a defendant, usually she
will not allow a waiver of the right to counsel.

2.
(1966).

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 15 L. Ed. 2d 694
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Crane:

So once the guy gets a lawyer, the lawyer tells
him not to answer the examining magistrate's
questions, right?

Grbzyk:

Quite the contrary. The lawyer almost always
advises him to answer.

Crane:

Even though his answers might be used against
him in the dossier?

Grbzyk:

Yes. Don't forget, if he refuses to answer, he
will be faced with the same questions at trial,
and-as we discussed earlier-he will pretty
much have to answer them then.

Crane:

So he might as well look cooperative from the
get-go, to minimize his sentence.

Grbzyk:

Correct. And if he confesses before trial, there
is not much point in refusing to confess again at
the trial.

Crane:

Each aspect of this thing seems to support the
other.

Grbzyk:

Quite so. And there is another reason for him
to answer the examining magistrate's questions.
The magistrate also has the power to decide
whether the defendant is detained or released
pending trial.

Crane:

So if he wants to stay out of the pokey, he'd
better be nice.

Grbzyk:

You Americans are very practical, Mr. Crane.

Crane:

So are you Europeans. Your whole system
seems designed to get a confession as soon as
possible, even though you go through the
motions of telling the guy he doesn't have to
answer.

Grbzyk:

He does have the right not to answer. But we
see no point in encouraging him to exercise that
right, the way you Americans do. Our goal is to
fmd the truth, and the defendant is in a very
good position to help us accomplish that task.
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What is wrong with asking him to tell us what
he knows?
Crane:

We've had some bad experiences with that,
going back to the Star Chamber in England and
"third degree" interrogations in the United
States, with the police beating and threatening
people if they won't talk.

Grbzyk:

So have we.
Don't forget the Spanish
Inquisition, and we did allow torture until the
19th century. But that is all behind us now,
and torture and threats are illegal. So long as
they are, why shouldn't we simply ask the
defendant to tell what happened?

Crane:

It's just not right for the government to intrude
into someone's mind, into his private thoughts.

Grbzyk:

But you intrude into private thoughts quite
frequently, don't you?
Any non-defendant
witness may be compelled to testify about his
thoughts, so long as they are relevant and no
recognized privilege applies. In this very case,
police officers were compelled to testify about
what they thought about many things, including
probable cause to search and their beliefs about
race and interracial marriage.

Crane:

True, but a defendant in a criminal case is
different.
The government has many more
resources than the defendant. They should
have to prove the case without using him to
help them.

Grbzyk:

So in the adversary system, you handicap the
prosecution in order to make the game fair, even
if this detracts from finding the truth?

Crane:

Look, the prosecution has plenty of ways to
prove the truth. They have investigators, crime
labs, the FBI, and the whole government
apparatus when they need it. In the usual case,
the defense has just one lawyer and, if you're
lucky, maybe an investigator or two.
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Grbzyk:

Yes, but in a given case, all the government's
resources might be insufficient. In this case, for
example, the prosecution must prove its case by
inference, with blood samples, DNA tests, and
evidence of motivation and opportunity. But
only one person who is still alive saw exactly
what happened and knows exactly what his
mental state was when (and if) he did it. That's
the defendant himself. Why not allow the court
to ask him?

Crane:

Maybe it comes down to this. We don't think
it's right to make people incriminate themselves
with their own words.

Grbzyk:

Strange. When European parents fmd cookies
missing from the cookie jar and ask their child
what happened, they do not expect the child to
answer, "It's not right to ask me to incriminate
myself." Are u.S. parents different?

Crane:

Of course not, but criminal defendants aren't
kids. A kid who steals cookies might be sent to
his room for an hour, but a criminal defendant
will be sent to a very small cell for a very long
time, and maybe to the gas chamber. The
parents are trying to help the kid learn how to
behave. The government is not trying to help
the defendant in any way, shape, or form. It's
not the same.

Grbzyk:

You seem to dislike our reliance on confessions,
Mr. Crane. But u.S. attorneys advise most of
their clients to confess, don't they?

Crane:

We do?

Grbzyk:

Yes. Isn't that what you do during your plea
bargaining? You advise your client to plead
guilty, in order to obtain the benefits of the
bargain. Isn't that pretty much a confession?

Crane:

I hadn't thought of it like that.

Grbzyk:

So perhaps your system relies on confessions

just as much as ours does.
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Crane:

Interesting. Even though our systems look
really different on the surface, maybe there are
similarities, once you look a little deeper.

Grbzyk:

Possibly. But it is risky to assume that "we are
all the same, at bottom." There might in fact be
some real differences. And now we must return
to court.

They rise and begin walking, as do Clare and Schmrz.
Clare:

Is the inquisitorial system the same throughout
Europe, Professor?

Schmrz:

Yes and no. There are fundamental features
that do not vary much. Judges, not the parties,
are responsible for developing the evidence. The
judge receives a dossier before the trial begins.
There are other common features I will explain
when we have more time. There are variations,
however.
In smaller cases, what you call
misdemeanors, the tribunal might consist of
only one judge and two lay assessors. Some
countries
use
tribunals
where
judges
outnumber lay assessors.
Germany, for
example, uses three judges and two lay
assessors in cases of serious crime. And some
countries use no lay assessors at all except in
major cases. The procedure you will see in this
case is somewhat typical, but other countries
might differ a bit. Italy has a sort of hybrid
system.

Clare:

Our adversary system also varies somewhat
from state to state. I guess it's the same here.

Schmrz:

Exactly. A very good analogy.

Scene

m: The Courtroom

Presiding Judge: Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Sampson.
We appreciate your candor. A truly amazing
story. Oh, excuse me. Does counsel have any
further questions for the accused?
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Clare:

I guess not, your honor. You seem to have
asked everything I was going to ask.

Crane:

Your astute questioning would put most U.S.
lawyers to shame. No questions, your grace.

Presiding Judge: Why thank you, Mr. Crane. How very kind.

****
Presiding Judge: Detective Farmer, please tell us what happened
when you went to the home of the accused.
Farmer:

I went there to tell him his ex-wife had been
killed. But his gate was closed, and no one
answered the intercom. So I climbed over the
gate. I found this glove on the driveway. (He
displays a glove.) It matches a glove we found
at the murder scene.

Crane:

Objection, your honor. That glove was obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Presiding Judge: The what, Mr. Crane?
Crane:

Sorry, Judge. Wrong country. We contend that
Detective Farmer conducted an illegal search by
hopping the gate without a warrant.

Presiding Judge: So?
Crane:

So? So the glove can't be 1;lsed in evidence.

Presiding Judge: Why not? It is relevant evidence, is it not?
Crane:

That doesn't matter. If it was obtained by an
illegal search, it goes out. Everyone knows that.

Presiding Judge: Not everyone in Europe knows that, Mr. Crane.
We assume that the tribunal should consider all
relevant evidence.
We do not employ the
exclusionary rule, as you call it in the United
States, except in extreme cases.
Crane:

Then how do you make your police behave?
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Presiding Judge: All of our police work for the Ministry of Justice,
which is part of our central government. When
the Minister issues an order, every policeman in
the country must obey it, or suffer demotion or
termination of employment.
In the United
States, this cannot happen. You have many
hundreds of independent cities, counties, and
states, each running its own police department.
The only institution you have for setting

minimum

standards

of behavior for

all

policemen is your Supreme Court. And the only
tool your Supreme Court has for enforcing those
standards is to order that illegally-obtained
evidence be excluded.
Crane:

True, your honor, but even here in Europe, with
a more transient population and an increase in
crime, your cops will tend to feel the pressure to
harass certain people. And the cops' bosses will
tend to look the other way. That's why courts
need to keep out illegally-seized evidence in
order to deter the police from doing that kind of
stuff.

Presiding Judge: The circumstances you describe have not
afflicted Europe as much as the United States.
Crane:

Times change, Judge.

Presiding Judge: You're quite right, Mr. Crane. Times do change.
Some European countries have begun to
experience more police abuses, and some have
begun to apply an exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained by certain acts, such as illegal
wiretapping. As yet, none has gone so far as the

United States. In our tradition, the goal of a
criminal trial is to f'md the truth, not to serve
other ends. But who knows what the future will
hold?

****
Presiding Judge: Detective Farmer, what did Mr. Crawford tell
you about the activities of the accused that
night?
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Objection, your honor. That calls for hearsay.

Presiding Judge: Hearsay, counsel? We do not recognize such an
objection.

Crane:

What? I thought the point of an inquisitorial
trial is to fmd the truth. In the United States,
the key to making sure that witnesses tell the
truth is cross-examination. Detective Farmer is
here in court, so I can cross-examine him as to
what he says he heard from Mr. Crawford. But
Crawford isn't here, so if he was mistaken or
lying about what he told the detective, I can't
bring that out by cross-examining him. That's
why we exclude hearsay, your honor, and you
should too.

Presiding Judge: You give good reasons for according less weight
to hearsay, Mr. Crane, but why exclude it
entirely? Isn't it worth something? It might
help us to see the entire picture, and what's the
harm in letting Mr. Farmer tell us what he
heard?
Crane:

Jurors aren't well-trained and experienced
enough to make the fme distinctions that you
are making. They might not see the difference
between hearsay and what the detective saw
himself. They might give too much weight to
the hearsay.

Presiding Judge: But I will be there to help them make these
distinctions. Don't forget: in our system, the
judges and the lay assessors deliberate together.
Crane:

So you have no rules of evidence? Everything

comes in?
Presiding Judge: Not everything. Evidence must still be relevant
to the case, and we do recognize certain
privileges, as you do. A doctor may not testify
as to what his patient told him, nor may a
lawyer tell what his client told him. We want to
encourage patients and clients to speak freely to
But your stricter rules of
professionals.
evidence are built on the premise that untrained
lay people, your jurors, might easily become
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confused or distracted if you did not limit what
they could hear. We have no such problem, for
we do not treat our lay assessors as a separate
body.
Crane:

I think I'm starting to catch on to something. I
can't just compare a feature of our system with
a similar feature of your system. Each part is
affected by other parts. I really have to consider
the system as a whole.

Presiding Judge: Quite so, Mr. Crane. People often look at an
isolated aspect of a system, fmd it attractive,
and assume that it may be transferred intact to
another system. This is a mistake. Both the

adversarial and the inquisitorial systems are
integrated systems. Each piece is affected and
supported by every other piece. Transfer a piece
without its support system, and it will probably
fail or distort some other features that you
didn't intend to affect.

****
Presiding Judge: Ms. Bruin, did you ever see the Accused strike
his ex-wife?
Crane:

Objection, your honor. Evidence of prior crimes
or bad acts should be inadmissible to show that
the defendant has a bad character.

Clare:

But it is admissible to show that he had a
motive to kill, or a pattern of behavior that is
consistent with the method of killing. That's
what this evidence shows, your honor.

Presiding Judge: An interesting dispute. I would expect you to
make these arguments at the end of the trial,
when you try to persuade the tribunal how
much weight we should give to any evidence
that he struck her. But why are you arguing
this now?
Crane:

If I'm right, then the evidence is inadmissible.

You and your fellow judges and jurors shouldn't
even be hearing it.

It's too prejudicial.

Once
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you hear it, you might not be able to put it out
of your minds.
Presiding Judge: Mr. Crane, in U.S. bench trials, your judges
often hear evidence, rule it inadmissible, and
then go on to decide the case. You trust them to
disregard such evidence. Why don't you trust
me?
Crane:

Of course I trust you, your honor, but I'm not so
sure about these lay jurors. They don't have
your training and experience.
They might
convict just because this evidence shows that
the defendant is a bad guy, not because he

committed the killings.
Presiding Judge: Recall the response I made to your hearsay
objection. I will be in the deliberation room to
advise the lay assessors how to perform their
jobs, and to prevent them from acting
improperly. Your U.S. jurors are not so well
monitored as ours. Objection overruled.

****
Presiding Judge: Doctor, please tell us the results of your DNA
testing on the hair samples.
Crane:

Objection, your honor. We haven't heard any
convincing evidence that DNA testing is
scientifically valid.

Presiding Judge: Such evidence would be helpful, to be sure, but
I am not aware of any statute that prevents us
from hearing the doctor's testimony.
Crane:

There's no statute, your honor, but I've got a
case. In People v. Glump, the court held that a
defendant was denied a fair trial when a
technician testified about a breathalyzer test

without evidence that the device they used was
scientifically valid.
Presiding Judge: So?
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So that case is precedent for my position, your
honor. Glump seems to stand for the larger
principle that-

Presiding Judge: Counsel, I do not care about Glump. We do not
treat precedent as you do in the United States.
In your common-law system, the law evolves
through the application of the law to specific
facts, so your published decisions are very
important in determining what the law is. But
in our system, the law is fIXed by the
Legislature, and it is changed by the
Legislature, not by th~ ,90urts.
Evolution
depends on changing values. and we leave the
examination of values to our legislative bodies.
So we have little need for case precedent.
Crane:

All right, judge, here's my trump card: Glump
was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Now
will you pay a little more attention to it?

Presiding Judge: Not much, at least in the way you want me to
use it. If I am unsure as to the meaning of
certain terms used in a statute, I might fmd
guidance in a reported decision, especially from
such a prestigious body as the Supreme Court.
But the facts of the case-breathalyzers, DNA,
whatever-mean little or nothing to me. If you
can show me something in this Glump decision
that explains the meaning of a statute that
applies to our case, I'll be happy to look at it,
Mr. Crane.
Crane:

Sony, your honor, Glump doesn't do that.

Scene IV: On the Courthouse steps

Clare:

I needed this break. My head is still spinning.

Schmrz:

The adjustment must be difficult for you.

Clare:

I guess I can handle it. If I can handle Crane, I
can do any ... Speak of the devil.

Crane and Grbzyk approach.
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Crane:

How you doin', Ms. D.A.?

Clare:

Not bad, Counselor. Just ruminating over the
peculiarities of this inquisitorial system. Do you
understand it?

Crane:

Perfectly. No problem at all. I'm a quick study.

Clare:

Yeah, sure.

Crane:

Now that you mention it, I might be a little
shaky on a couple of nuances. I have to admit
I'm having trouble predicting how this case is
going to come out. It's hard enough to make
predictions in our own courts. Here, with all
these foreigners-well, it worries me.

Clare:

I was thinking the same thing.

Crane:

I don't want my client convicted of two fIrst
degree murders.

Clare:

And I don't want to go back to Los Angeles with
nothing but an acquittal to show for it.

They eye each other.
Crane and Clare: (together) Let's dealt
They huddle.
Clare:

Plead him guilty to just one first degree charge,
and I'll drop the second charge.

Crane:

Are you kidding? He'd still get life. One charge
of involuntary manslaughter.
That's my
absolute top offer.

Clare:

Very funny. How about-

Schmrz:

Excuse me. What are you two doing?

Crane:

We're plea bargaining.

Schmrz:

Plea bargaining?
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Clare:

Yes. We do a little horse-trading, and maybe we
can come to an agreement. I drop or reduce
some charges, and perhaps agree to recommend
a certain sentence. In return, he agrees to
plead guilty.

Crane:

If, of course, my client agrees.

Schmrz:

In the United States, you bargain over justice
like farmers bargain over horses? You consider
this dignified?

Crane:

Is it less dignified than. pushing a guy to
confess, Professor?

Grbzyk:

At least our practice leads to the truth and a
just result.
Plea bargaining does just the
opposite. According to the evidence we heard,
your client is either guilty of two murders or
guilty of no crime at all. How can you even
consider a single manslaughter charge?

Clare:

But that's what bargaining is all about. Each
side gives up something. I want two murders,
and he wants no crime at all. So we cut a deal.

Crane:

And there's something you're overlooking. As I
understand it, your sentences are pretty
reasonable compared to ours. You mostly use
fmes, and when you do incarcerate people, it's
usually for short terms. In the United States,
our potential sentences are extremely high, and
sometimes the legislature fixes the punishment
and gives the judge no discretion to lower it for
a particular defendant who doesn't deserve that
much.
So plea bargaining is our way of
reaching a just result.

Clare:

Why are your sentences so low? Don't you want
to stop crime?

Schmrz:

Of course we do. But we do it by curing the
offender of his deviant ways and reintegrating
him into society as soon as possible. The state
assumes a parental role with the offender. By
contrast, your system seems to be adversarial in
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more ways than one. Not only is the prosecutor
the adversaxy of the defendant, so is the state
itself. We prefer to see offenders as potentially
decent citizens who have temporarily gone
astray.
Clare:

We used to see them that way, but at some
point we gave up. These days, heavy criminals
are treated as permanent outcasts. We don't
see "reintegration" as a realistic possibility, so
we pretty much lock 'em up and throwaway the
key.

Grbzyk:

Do 'you think this is an effective way to reduce
crime?

Clare:

Sure. If they're in jail, they can't commit
crimes-at least not on the law-abiding
community.

Grbzyk:

But they will eventually get out. When they are
released, do their punishments make them less
likely to commit more crimes?

Crane:

No way. They'll be more likely to commit new
crimes. We don't spend much effort trying to
teach prisoners to adjust to society and earn
their way honestly, so they just learn more
about being criminals. And sentences being as
long as they are, often these guys are pretty
angry when they get out. We treat them as
outcasts, so that's what they become.

Grbzyk:

It seems odd. You punish your defendants more
severely than we do, in order to reduce crime,
and yet your crime rates are much higher than
ours. What conclusions may we draw from
this?

Crane:

It's pretty obvious, isn't it? Harsh punishments
don't work.

Clare:

That's ridiculous. You could just as logically
conclude that because of our high crime rates,
we need harsher punishments to prevent them
from going even higher.
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Schmrz:

One cannot infer causation just from
correlation.
High crime rates and high
punishments often go together, but we cannot
be sure whether either one has any causal
impact on the other.

Grbzyk:

Mr. Crane, earlier you seemed troubled by our
quest for confessions. But a confession is an
important step on the road to rehabilitation.
Until the offender admits he did wrong, how can
he change his ways?
A good confession
cleanses the soul.

Crane:

So because we don't· plan to do much to
rehabilitate him, it doesn't matter much
whether he confesses?

Clare:

That's a bit of an overstatement. When a judge
has discretion in sentencing, he will tend to go
easier on a defendant who admits his crime.
And the same is true of parole boards. So we do
get a lot of confessions, at least after trial.

Grbzyk:

Here in Europe, of course, the trial is about
both guilt and sentencing, so he can't very well
hold off confessing 'til after the trial. So it is
important that he confess at trial.

Schmrz:

I'd like to return to this plea bargaining for a
moment. Once the lawyers arrive at a bargain,

is that fmal? Does the judge have no say in
whether the bargain does justice to the state
and to the victim?
Clare:

Well, the judge can reject the deal. But he's
usually happy to accept it. It saves the court
the expense and trouble of a trial.

Schmrz:

But by reducing the charges you, the
prosecutor, have effectively reduced the
sentence. Is this proper? Are you trained in the
sociological and psychological aspects of
sentencing?
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Clare:

Not really, but neither are our judges. My guess
is probably as good as theirs. And if they think
I'm really off the mark, they can reject the deal.

Schmrz:

In Europe, the prosecutor may recommend a
certain sentence, but she does not make the
fmal determination, even partially. That is for
the court, not the prosecutor.

Grbzyk:

This plea bargaining is legal'in your counby?

Clare:

Legal? It's essentialI In most places, less than
twenty percent of our cases go to trial. The rest
are plea bargained. If they weren't, we'd be up
to our eyeballs in trials. We'd probably need five
times more prosecutors, judges, jurors,
courtrooms, bailiffs, and all the rest. Since
every defendant has the right to a speedy trial,
I'd have to dismiss a lot of cases if I couldn't
plea bargain.

Grbzyk:

I don't understand. If people in the United
States really believe that the adversary trial is
the best way to achieve justice, shOUldn't they
be more than willing to pay whatever it takes to
by every case?

Clare:

Tough question.
I guess they're not that
committed to the adversary trial. They may like
the general idea of it, but when it comes to
paying for it, they'd rather pay for more cops or
more prisons, where they can see some effects
on crime.

Scbmrz:

U.S. citizens are such a peculiar lot. Because
they like the general idea of the adversary trial,
they have made it so elaborate that they can
afford to give it to only one out of every five
defendantsl Strange, very strange. Wouldn't it
be better to make the trial less complex, so that
more defendants could have a trial? That might
make plea bargaining unnecessary.

Clare:

I never quite looked at it that way. In any event,
the way things are right now, we can't live
without plea bargaining.
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Schmrz:

And we can't live with it. Here it is illegal.

Crane:

Illegal? Why? If the parties agree to settle their
case, why should that bother the court?

Schmrz:

Because the case belongs to the court, not to
the parties. The tribunal may not convict or
sentence the defendant unless it fIrst hears the
evidence, and if the evidence shows that the
defendant committed a certain crime, the

tribunal may not reduce the crime just because
the prosecutor agrees to it.
Clare:

So every case goes to trial? .

Schmrz:

Every case, Madame. At least every major case.

Clare:

But not if the defendant pleads guilty.

Schmrz:

There is no such thing as a guilty plea in our
system. That would be permitting the parties
rather than the court to determine the truth,
which is not permissible. Every case goes to
trial. At the trial, the defendant might well
admit that the charges are true, and many do
so. But the tribunal must nevertheless hear
evidence, in order to determine the sentence.

Clare:

That must put a terrible burden on your courts.
Trials can take weeks, even months in a murder
case. It can take weeks just to pick ajury.

Grbzyk:

You forget. Our "jurors" are picked without the
lengthy voir dire and peremptory challenges that
take so much time in your courts. Most of our
trials do not take very long.
Because the
presiding judge questions the witnesses, we do
not take up much time with lawyers' crossexamination and the like. We do not allow
many objections to evidence, which may save us
more time. We have no need for the lengthy
pre-trial hearings on the admissibility of
evidence that you have. And the defendant
often confesses at trial, because he confessed
earlier. Even if he didn't, the dossier usually
contains rather strong evidence against him,
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and his denials, if seen as false, would affect his
sentence, so often he confesses for that reason
alone.
Because he confesses, very little
additional testimony is needed. Most of our
trials are really about the sentence, not about
guilt.

Crane:

So it ends up looking somewhat like one of our
sentencing hearings, which we must have
whether or not there is a plea bargain.

Grbzyk:

Yes, I suppose it does. However, I admit that we
have been seeking ways to ease the burden on
our system. As our crime rates rise, the volume
of cases also rises, and some European
countries have adopted devices that resemble
your plea bargaining. But in most countries,

such things are allowed only for misdemeanors,
never for major felonies, such as the present
case.
Clare:

If your crime rates are rising, you might have to
start dealing with organized crime, like we do.
Plea bargaining really helps us with that. We
bust the little guys, and give them plea bargains
to get them to "cooperate" and help us get the
big guys. Without plea bargains, we'd have
nothing to offer them.

Grbzyk:

I see. So U.S. prosecutors work closely with the
police?

Clare:

Absolutely. Our job is to help the cops fight
crime. That's what the public expects of us.

Grbzyk:

This is much less so in Europe.
Our
prosecutors see themselves as more closely
allied with the judiciary than with the police.
Some countries even allow prosecutors to
become judges.

Crane:

That must make your judges pro-prosecution.

Grbzyk:

The reverse would be more accurate: our
prosecutors tend to be "pro-judge," in the sense
that they are out to secure justice, not to get
convictions. For example, every prosecutor has
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a duty to present to the court all evidence that
favors the defendant, and they readily do so.
Clare:

Shocking.

Grbzyk:

I'm speaking generally, of course. Individual
prosecutors vary, and so do circumstances.
Italy has had a serious problem with organized
crime, and prosecutors there do work closely
with the police and aggressively seek to convict
Mafia leaders.

Crane:

If your prosecutors tend to think like judges,
why not give them the power to plea bargain?
You said you trust your judges.

Schmrz:

We trust our officials, so long as they do not
have much discretion. We fear that discretion
may be abused, as has occurred during periods
of dictatorship. Perhaps a prosecutor would
plea bargain because of political pressure from
friends of the accused.
We must protect
ourselves from such a possibility, so the
prosecutor is obliged to bring to trial every
charge supported by the evidence and the law,
at least in major cases. She has no discretion.

Crane:

But you give your judges a lot of discretion.

Schmrz:

No, we really don't. Under your common-law
system, the law is always changing or
"evolving," as you might put it. So your judges
must have discretion to change the law slightly
to adapt it to new situations, as society
changes. This is not so in our "civil-law"
system. Here, the law is fIXed by the legislature,
and the judge has no discretion to change it.

Clare:

Look, we have a lot of statutes too, and our
judges aren't supposed to change them. But
they can interpret them, and when they do, they
have plenty of discretion to plug in whatever
policies they happen to like.

Schmrz:

I suppose our judges do the same on occasion.

1156

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW {Vol. 28:1121

Grbzyk:

But we pretend they don't! We prefer to imagine
our judges as educated clerks, simply looking
up the rules in the codes and telling us what
they are. In truth, however, many of our
statutes are quite vague, and the judge has
some discretion in deciding what they mean. It
is somewhat of a paradox.

Crane:

Or maybe a "useful fiction," Professor?

Grbzyk:

Quite useful, Mr. Crane.

Clare:

Anyway, we can't plea bargain, so it's back to
the salt mines.

Scene V: At the cafe
The two lawyers and their consultants sit at one table,
drinking cognac.
Clare:

Usually when I fmish a trial, I'm exhausted.
This time, I didn't even work up a sweat.

Crane:

That's because you didn't do anything. Neither
did I. Just about every time we stood up, Judge
Big Shot told us to sit down and watch him do
everything. Who needs lawyers in this crazy
system? What's there for us to do?

Clare:

We help decorate the courtroom. That's why
they give us these snazzy black robes. We're not
lawyers, we're fashion statements.

Grbzyk:

Ah, you feel that you are not as important as
you are in the United States. I'm sorry. But
you still have significant roles here. Defense
counsel may summon witnesses not called by
the tribunal, though this rarely occurs. And
both counsel are expected to present fmal
arguments to the tribunal, reviewing the
evidence and the law, and arguing for a certain
verdict and sentence. Both of you did a fine job,
by the way, as did the victims' attorney.

Clare:

And now we wait for the verdict.
part. It drives me batty.

I hate this
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Crane:

What will the verdict look like? Will it be short,
like "not guilty" or "guilty, life imprisonment"?

Schmrz:

No, the tribunal's judgment will be quite long. It
will set out the facts of the case, in detail, and
the law that applies to the case, and explain
why the tribunal came to its conclusion, both
about guilt and about the sentence. It will
discuss the testimony of each witness.

Clare:

Who writes it?

Schmrz:

Usually the presiding judge will assign this task
to one of the other judges. It is never written by
a lay assessor.

Clare:

Most U.S. courts require that the verdict be
unanimous. Is that so here?

Schmrz:

No.
A majority vote is sufficient in some
countries. We require a two-thirds vote.

Crane:

Suppose one of the judges disagrees with the
judge who writes the decision. Will he write a
dissenting opinion?

Schmrz:

No. That would be unthinkable. It would tend
to undermine the court's authority. The public
must believe that every court decision is
unanimous.

Crane:

Even if it wasn't?

Schmrz:

Even if it wasn't.

Crane:

So much for honesty, Professor. What are you
afraid of? Do you think people won't obey the
decision or respect your courts if they know
someone disagreed with it?
Are your
institutions so fragile that they can't stand a
little dissent?

Schmrz:

I admit, it is troubling.
a

Clare:

It should be. In the United States, some states

allow less-than-unanimous votes by juries in
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some cases, and such votes must be announced
in open court. In our appellate courts, judges
often write dissents. We've had some very
important Supreme Court cases decided on five
to four votes, and people obey them. Dissent
doesn't necessarily lead to anarchy.
Schmrz:

At the present time, even our highest courts
never reveal that a judge dissented. I suppose a
dissent implies either that the majority was
incompetent, or that reasonable judges have the
discretion to interpret the law in different ways.
We do not want either message sent to the
public.

Crane:

Look, this is all very interesting, but I'm having
trouble concentrating, waiting for the verdict. I
hate this part too. If I lose, it's all over.

Grbzyk:

Not quite, Mr. Crane. You still have your right
of appeal.

Crane:

What's to appeal? The presiding judge seemed
to know what he was doing. I don't think he
made any mistakes. With virtually no rules of
evidence, what mistakes are there to make,
anyway? An appellate court would throw me
out: no mistakes, no reversal.

Grbzyk:

You might argue that the judgment is not
. supported by the law or the evidence.

Crane:

But then I run up against presumptions, don't
I? In the United States, the appellate court
looks at the reporter's transcript of the trial and
presumes that the jury resolved every credibility
battle in favor of the judgment, so if the cop said
one thing and my client said another, I'm out of
luck. And the appellate court also presumes
that the jury drew any reasonable inferences
that support their verdict.

Grbzyk:

So even if the jury in fact did not do these
things, the appellate court nevertheless
presumes that they did?
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Crane:

Exactly. I guess that's all our appellate courts
can do, because the jury never explains their
verdict, they just say "guilty." So the appellate
court never knows how the jury really reasoned
their way to the verdict.

Grbzyk:

But this is not so in our system. The judgment
must fully explain the tribunal's reasoning,
including why it believed one witness rather
than another. So the appellate court sees what
the tribunal actually thought, not what it might

have thought. And if the appellate court is not
persuaded by such reasoning, it might well

reverse the judgment.
Crane:

You talk about the tribunal's reasoning. There
are nine people on this tribunal, but the
judgment is written by just one of them. Is it
likely that nine people would have exactly the
same reasoning, especially when three of them
are professional judges and the others aren't?

Grbzyk:

Probably not. Another "useful fiction," perhaps.

Crane:

Do the appellate judges read the transcripts of
the trial to see if they support the judgment?

Grbzyk:

I'm afraid there are no transcripts, Mr. Crane.
We have no court reporters at our trials.

Crane:

But how do the appellate judges know if the
judgment correctly summarizes the testimony?
If I'm arguing a case on appeal, how can I show
that the facts stated in the judgment are
inaccurate?

Grbzyk:

Our trial judges receive many hours of training
in writing judgments, and I suppose we trust
them to summarize the testimony honestly.

Crane:

Amazing. Well, I hope this tribunal acquits my
client, so I don't have to deal with one of your
appeals.

Schmrz:

Sorry, Mr. Crane, but an acquittal is no
guarantee that you won't face an appeal. In our
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system, the prosecutor may appeal too. This is
important to us, as it helps to ensure that the
trial court follows the law.
We strive for
consistency in all of our courts. And if the
appellate court reverses, your client may be
tried again.
Clare:

Really? In the United States, I think one or two
states allow prosecutors to appeal, but only to
get an advisory opinion on some important
issue. And if the prosecutor wins, it doesn't
affect the defendant. He can't be retried. That
would violate his right against double jeopardy.

Schmrz:

Here he may be retried. We do have concepts
similar to your double jeopardy, but they have
no application to an ongoing case. So the
prosecution may appeal, and if the appellate

court reverses, the defendant may be retried.
Crane:

The way we see it, once a jury acquits him,
that's it. A jury's verdict is sacred.

Schmrz:

Sacred when it acquits, but not when it
convicts? Why should you allow the defendant
to appeal, but not the prosecution? How does
that make sense?

Crane:

We don't allow a conviction to stand if it doesn't
square with the law. But if the jury acquits
because the jury doesn't agree with the law, the
verdict stands. The jury "nullifies" the law, just
for that case. It doesn't happen often, but we
view it as an outlet for public disagreement with
a law that's not too popular, like laws against
smoking a small amount of marijuana, for
example.

Schmrz:

For us, the very notion of allowing a tribunal to
nullify a law is inconceivable. We would never
allow it, not even in a single case. As I said
earlier, we do not tolerate discretion lightly, and
this seems to be discretion run wild. It could
never happen here, because judges sit with our

lay assessors.

Even if it did happen, the

tribunal's written decision would reveal what
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they had done, and it would never stand up on
appeal.
Crane:

There's another reason why we allow a retrial
after a conviction, but not after an acquittal.
The prosecution can afford another trial, but the
defendant can't. Even if he has the money for
another trial, or the state is paying his lawyer, it
is just too difficult emotionally. And if the
prosecutor could retry him once, why not two or
three times? Eventually, they would wear him

down to the point that he would probably rather
take a plea bargain.
So once there is an
acquittal, that has to be the end of it.
Grbzyk:

Let's not forget the sentence. I believe your
double jeopardy doctrine does not prevent
prosecutors from appealing improper sentences.
The same is true here.
And the defense
attorney, of course, may also appeal an
improper sentence.

Crane:

Thanks a lot.

Grbzyk:

And even if you don't appeal, the prosecutor
may appeal on the defendant's behalf.

Clare:

Why would I do a thing like that?

Schmrz:

Because it is your duty to do justice, Madame.

Crane:

Justice? She's never heard of it.

Clare:

This place is really weird.

Crane:

That's what I said.

Clare:

Do prosecutors really do that?

Schmrz:

Not often. If the trial court might have erred
against the defendant, usually the defendant
will appeal.

Grbzyk:

Of course, the defendant who appeals risks the
imposition of further costs if he loses.
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Crane:

You mean his attorney's fees?

Grbzyk:

Yes, of course, but not only that. Every losing
defendant is assessed certain court costs, not
including the prosecutor's costs. And if the
victim intervened, the losing defendant must
also pay the victim's attorney's fees.

Clare:

That's a lot more than most of our states
require. I guess your system can discourage a
defendant from dragging out the trial, or from
appealing.

Grbzyk:

I suppose so, but that is not its purpose. We
simply feel that it is just to compel a guilty
person to make the state and the victim whole.

Clare:

Does it work the other way? If he is acquitted,
does the state make him whole by paying his
attorney's fees?

Grbzyk:

Yes, as a matter of fact it does.

Clare:

We don't do that in the United States.

Grbzyk:

Perhaps that is because you sometimes acquit
people not because they are innocent, but for
extraneous reasons. You release the guilty
where illegally seized evidence is excluded, and
without such evidence you cannot obtain a
conviction. This is not likely to happen in our
system. If we acquit a man, he is probably truly
innocent, so he should suffer no loss at all.

Crane:

In the United States, none of this stuff would
matter much, as the overwhelming majority of
criminal defendants are indigent. They couldn't
even pay for my lunch. In those cases, the state
has to pay for their lawyers, usually public
defenders.

Grbzyk:

We do the same, at least in cases of serious
crime. And indigent defendants cannot be
required to pay any costs. In such cases, the
issue of making the state and the intervenor
whole is really moot.
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Schmrz:

Your client, of course, is not indigent, Mr.
Crane. In fact, some have accused him of
spending so much money on his defense that he
is trying to "buy an acquittal."

Crane:

Look, in the usual case, the prosecution uses or
has access to many more resources than the
defense. They have several lawyers available in
the D.A.'s office, and they have their own
investigators, plus the whole police department,
a crime lab, and other agencies like the F.B.I. to
tum to for help. And all this against a single
defense lawyer with little investigative help. Do
people accuse the prosecutors of trying to "buy
convictions?" Of course not. In Mr. Sampson's
case, the resources are almost equal for a
change, so we have about as good a chance as
the prosecutors to show the jury the whole
story. That's not unfair. What's unfair is what
happens in the other ninety-nine percent of the
cases.

Schmrz:

I hadn't thought of it that way.

Crane:

In some cases, a U.S. defendant doesn't even
have a lawyer. Our Supreme Court has held
that a defendant has a constitutional right to
represent himself, without a lawyer, if he's
stupid enough to go that route. It's his case, so
he can handle it as he likes. Do you allow this?

Schmrz:

No. Every defendant must have counsel.

Clare:

Why? It's the defendant's neck, isn't it?

Schmrz:

Madame forgets.
In our countries, the
proceedings are held not for the benefit of the
parties, but for the state. It is the duty of the
tribunal to fmd the truth, and defense counsel
is better qualified than the defendant to aid this
effort.

Clare:

Remarkable. Everything we talk about seems to
keep coming back to the same fundamental
concepts. Where do they come from? Why does
the United States start with the notion that the

1164

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW {Vol. 28:1121

parties run the trial, and Europeans start with
the notion that the state runs it?
Grbzyk:

An

excellent question.
Perhaps the United
States has a very different attitude towards
government and authority than we do.

Schmrz:

I agree. To put it bluntly, Europeans trust
authority, and Americans don't.
Speaking
generally, of course.

Crane:

That's true about us. The easiest way to get
elected to government office in the United States
is to attack government, especially the central
governments in Washington and the state
capitals.

Grbzyk:

But it goes well beyond campaign slogans. In
the United States, you display your mistrust of
authority by dividing it up. Europeans are not
so afraid of concentrating it. Our judges have a
great deal of power. They investigate the case
before trial, examine all the witnesses during
trial, and then deliberate right along with the
lay assessors. Everyone else, the lawyers, the
lay assessors, takes a back seat to the judges.
This concentrates most of the power in one
institution: the judges.

Crane:

I don't think U.S. citizens would tolerate that.

Grbzyk:

Quite so. Your judges may be respected, but in
a trial of a major crime, they have very little
power compared to European judges. But your
fear of the concentration of power goes even
further. In your system, no one individual has
much power because you divide it into so many
pieces. The prosecutor, not a judge, investigates
the case. The lawyers, not the judge, present
the evidence at trial. The judge sits primarily as
an umpire, making sure that the lawyers obey
the rules. And your jury, not the judge, decides
who wins. But then the judge may set aside a
verdict of conviction if he feels it is not
supported by the evidence, and the judge, not
the jury, sentences the defendant. But often
your legislature has severely limited the judge's
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discretion in sentencing, so he has little to do
except apply the legislature's predetermined
formula. Then an appellate court decides if the
whole thing was done properly. And your press
keeps watch to tell the world if any of these actors
has behaved improperly.
Everyone-lawyers,
jurors, judges, the legislature, reporters-has a
little piece of the power. No one has it all, or even
a major part of it.
Clare:

You make us sound like a bunch of paranoids.

Schmrz:

That's for you to decide. I'm merely stating the
facts.

Crane:

Perhaps this is why the U.S. system seems so
complicated. Because we don't trust judges, we
use a bunch of untrained amateurs: the jurors.
But because we don't totally trust a bunch of
amateurs we've never seen before, we have to
take a lot of time questioning them and
selecting them. Then we need complex rules of
evidence to keep them from hearing stuff we
don't think they can evaluate properly. Because
we don't want too much power in judges, we
have the lawyers investigate the case and
examine and cross-examine the witnesses,
which takes more time. And because our jurors
don't know the law, the judge must spend time
instructing the jury on the law. You don't have
any of these things under your inquisitorial
system.

Clare:

Our adversarial system doesn't seem very
efficient.

Grbzyk:

No, it doesn't. Our trials usually take a fraction
of the time yours take. One study showed that
the average European trial for a serious crime
takes about one day.

Crane:

Maybe so, Professor, but a monarchy is more
efficient than a democracy. Kings can make
decisions a lot quicker and cheaper than a
bunch of quarrelsome legislators.
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Grbzyk:

Touche, Mr. Crane. I catch your drift. Maybe
our authoritarian mentality is showing.
A
vestige of the past, perhaps.

Clare:

And maybe ours is a case of democracy run
amok.

Crane:

Wait a minute. Don't forget plea bargaining.
Your trials might take less time than ours, but
in your system every case goes to trial. Our
trials are longer, but over 80% of our cases don't
even go to trial. Plea bargained cases are
handled at least as efficiently as your trials,
maybe more so.

Grbzyk:

It seems ironic.
You have this elaborate
structure for your trials, no doubt for good
reasons, but then you totally dispense with this
structure in the great majority of your cases.
Apparently, whatever reasons you have for your

complex trial system are not good enough to
persuade you to keep it for most of your cases.
Is this not weird?
Clare:

Our "elaborate structure," as you call it, is
mainly for the benefit of the defendant. If he's
,willing to waive it, that's his right. Nothing
ironic about that. We respect the right of the
individual to decide what's best for him.

Grbzyk:

And we view the features of our system as being
there for the state, not the parties.

Schmrz:

I suspect that the jury is the fulcrum of your
system. Suppose you just eliminated the jury,
and all of your criminal cases were to be decided
by judges. How would your citizens react?

Crane:

I'm not sure. The jury might be on the way out.
In civil cases, especially business disputes, more
and more cases are being handled by
arbitrators. Most criminal cases are still tried
by juries, but there have been changes that tend
to make the jury somewhat less attractive, at
least to defense attorneys. Traditionally, juries
have been made up of twelve people, and their
verdicts have had to be unanimous. But now
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some states allow juries of as few as six people,
and some allow less than unanimous verdicts,
like ten to two.
Clare:

Sure. It's cheaper with fewer people. And
nonunanimous verdicts make a hung jury less
likely, so we have to re-try cases less often.
That saves money, as well as the burden on
citizens called for jury duty. .

Crane:

It also means you get more convictions, and
that makes me a bit less eager to have a jury
trial. What kind of a jury do I get? I used to be
able to voir dire jurors pretty extensively, to fmd
out what these strangers were really like. Now,
in a lot of jurisdictions, the judge does most or
all of the voir dire.

Clare:

That saves a lot of time.

Crane:

It sure does. The judge asks them "Can you be
fair?" Then he gets the expected answer, and
swears 'em in! When I did voir dire, I would try

to draw out a juror's true feelings about whether
they would automatically believe a cop's
testimony, how they feel about the crime
charged, and whether they could put aside their
personal feelings and follow the judge's
instruction on reasonable doubt.
Schmrz:

But you still have your peremptory challenges.

Crane:

Yes, but how can I exercise them intelligently if I
don't know how the juror feels about these
things? Sometimes I just have to go by what
the juror looks like.

Clare:

Watch out with that one.
dangerous ground.

Crane:

Right. The courts have held that an attorney,
criminal or civil, prosecution or defense, may
not exercise a peremptory because of a juror's
race or sex. So I can't go by what they look like,
and I can't get into their heads. I'm flying blind.

You're treading on
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Clare:

Come on.
Don't you hire high-priced jury
consultants?

Crane:

I have to, because I can't do much else.
Consultants give me ideas about body language,
jurors' occupations, and other things that
indicate what these people are like. That's
about all that's left for me to go on. But it's a
rare case where I have a client that can afford a
jury consultant.
In most criminal cases,
particularly where the defendant is indigent, the
defense attorney has to pick jurors by the seat
of his pants.

Clare:

It's no better for prosecutors. I live by the same
rules you do.
I need my voir dire and

peremptories to get rid of flakes who might
cause a hung jury. It's very expensive to re-try
cases. It's well worth spending a little extra
time and money up front to get a jury of
sensible people, so we can try the case just once
and get it over with.
Crane:

It's sad to see this weakening of the American
jury.
People used to view the jury as
fundamental to our notion of individualism. A
jury protects the accused from the government,
and the judge is seen as part of the government.

Clare:

The prosecution needs protection too. In a lot of
cases, I'd rather make my pitch to twelve
ordinary citizens than to one judge, who might
be some liberal appointed by a liberal governor.

Crane:

Come on. You know very well that most of them
are ex-D.A.'s appointed by a conservative
governor.

Clare:

Are you kidding? Let me tell you about a case I
had in front of Judge ....

Schmrz:

An interesting dispute. It would not arise here.

Clare:

Why not?

Schmrz:

As you indicate, your judges are usually
appointed by elected officials, and elected
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officials often have deftnite philosophies about
crime, punishment, and the like. They will tend
to select people with a similar philosophy. And
those people will have displayed their outlooks
by their prior work. Most of them were former
prosecutors, defense attorneys, personal injury
lawyers, corporate lawyers. Whatever. Your
governor has a pretty good idea how each of
these specialists views the world, and he
appoints accordingly.
Crane:

And some of our judges are elected, usually
after campaign battles over law and order.

Schmrz:

Yes. These matters are relevant to the tasks
your judges perform, which often involve much

discretion in fact-fmding, sentencing, and
establishing the law. In our system, we try to
minimize the judge's discretion, so her values

are not important.
Clare:

How do you pick your judges?

Grbzyk:

In a way, we don't. They pick themselves. Let
me explain. We do not have law schools as
such, the separate post-graduate institutions
that you have.
Our law students are
undergraduate university students, who study
with the law faculty. At the end of their studies,
they make a choice: to become lawyers or to
become judges. If they wish to become lawyers,
they must apprentice with a law office for a year
or two, and then take a state examination. If
they choose the judiciary path, they must pass
a special state examination upon graduation. It
is quite competitive, and very few are accepted.
The candidate's political beliefs are wholly
irrelevant to whether he or she is accepted.

Clare:

Aren't they kind of young to be judges?

Grbzyk:

Of course. But before they are allowed to
handle cases, they must serve apprenticeships

with experienced judges.

Then they are

assigned small civil and criminal cases. As they
gain more experience and demonstrate their

1170

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW {Vol. 28:1121

competence, they may be promoted to higher
courts and be assigned more significant cases.
Note that all three of the judges in our case are
quite mature.
Clare:

So politics has nothing to do with it?

Grbzyk:

Nothing at all-we hope. Our judges are civil
servants, not politicians. Each has political
beliefs, of course, like any citizen does, and
different judges might have different attitudes
towards crime, sentencing, and the like. But a
judge's political beliefs should have as little to

do with her job as the court clerk's political
beliefs affect his job.
Clare:

Politics isn't necessarily a bad thing, you know.
If a governor is elected on a tough-on-crime
platform, he appoints tough-on-crime judges
because that's what the people want.

Grbzyk:

If our people choose to get tough on crime, they
may elect legislators to enact statutes that do
this. It is not the judge's place to make such
choices.

Crane:

So let's get to the bottom line, Professor. Which
system is better?

Grbzyk:

Better? Your question is very revealing, Mr.
Crane. It displays a common assumption that a
legal system may be appraised apart from the
society it serves. But it can't. It cannot be
constructed by experts and imposed from above.
A nation's legal system emerges from the
attitudes of its people. Asking which country's
legal system is better is like asking which
country's people are better.

Crane:

So our system is complex and messy because
we are complex and messy?

Clare:

No.
Our system breaks up power because
Americans don't want power concentrated.

Schmrz:

And our system concentrates power because
this is more efficient, and because it does not
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particularly bother our people. We have had
kings, queens, and other strong leaders for
centuries, so perhaps our people have gotten
used to it, even though they now claim to favor
democracy.
Also, as discussed earlier, we
operate under the principle, or perhaps the
illusion, that our judges have little discretion,
that they merely apply the law mechanically.
Crane:

Times change, Professor.

Schmrz:

Indeed they do, Mr. Crane. Italy has recently
changed its legal system. It is moving away
from the inquisitorial system and toward your
adversarial system. The Italians have retained
their mixed panel, but they have taken away the
power of judges to present the evidence, giving it
to the lawyers.

Clare:

Really? That's greatl Why did they do it?

Schmrz:

They say that they now realize that the
adversarial system gives greater respect to the
rights of the individual.

Crane:

That's true. The parties have the most at stake,
so their lawyers should control the presentation
of the case.

Grbzyk:

Of all Europeans, I think the Italians are most
similar to the United States in your dislike of
concentrations of power. They would rather
spread it out.

Schmrz:

These are the justifications given by the Italians,
officially. But others suspect that something
else is at work. For years, one of the most
popular television programs in Italy has been
your "Perry Mason," where a handsome trial
lawyer always manages to win at the last
moment.
You know how Italians love a
dramatic spectacle, like opera.

Clare:

So we put on a better show than you do?
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Grbzyk:

That we must concede. U.S. trials have much
better Nielsen ratings than European trials.

Crane:

The adversarial system demands a lot more
from lawyers than the inquisitorial system does.
Are Italian lawyers up to it?

Schmrz:

That remains to be seen. It will be difficult.
Many Italian lawyers prepare for trial simply by
reviewing their code books.
They have no
training in cross-examination, preparation of
experts, and the like.

Crane:

Those are the bread and butter tasks of U.S.
lawyers. We take courses in those skills, read
books on them, and practice them every day in
court, for years. You can't learn them in a day.

Schmrz:

The transition will not be easy.

Clare:

I've never heard of a country grafting an
important feature of one system onto another
type of system, like the Italians are doing. Is it
really possible?

Schmrz:

A good question. I'm not sure that the Italians
have thought that question through carefully
enough. If and when their lawyers learn the
U.S. style of trial advocacy, perhaps other
aspects of their system will also have to change,
or else they might have to give up the notion of
letting lawyers control the evidence. I'm not
sure that one can just plonk a major foreign
feature into an existing system without radically
altering the entire system.

Crane:

Professor, you didn't like my question about
which system is better. So let me rephrase it.
Which system does a better job of finding the
truth?

Grbzyk:

You insist on pinning me down, eh? Well, let
me begin by passing along a little saying I once
heard: "An innocent defendant should prefer to
be tried in Europe, while a guilty defendant
should prefer to be tried in the United States."
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Wonderful! A supreme compliment to the skills
of U.S. defense lawyers-like me, naturally.
(shaking her head) Look at him. He's proud of

it!
Crane:

Just kidding, Counsel.
sense of humor.

Prosecutors have no

Grbzyk:

The saying implies, of course, that the
inquisitorial system does a better job of fmding
the truth.

Crane:

Who said the saying, a European?

Grbzyk:

This I must admit.

Schmrz:

Let's examine the issue a little more closely. I
suppose the key difference we should focus on is
who decides what is the truth. You use lay
jurors and we use professional judges,
sometimes along with lay people. But as you
pointed out, Mr. Crane, lay people tend to go
along with judges. Isn't it rather obvious that
professionals are better at their jobs than
amateurs? Professionals have been selected for
their aptitude, then they are trained, and then
they spend much more time at their jobs than
amateurs ever could.
A research biologist
stands a much better chance of flnding the true
cause of cancer than does some barber or
baseball player. By the same token, judges are
bound to be better at fmding the truth at trial
than jurors could ever hope to be.

Crane:

Wait a minute. Judges are trained to know and
apply the law. They don't take courses in law
school on how to flgure out who's telling the
truth. And another thing: criminal trials aren't
about fmding the cure for cancer.

Schrorz:

Sometimes they seem like it. In the trial we just
observed, several scientists testifled about the
accuracy of DNA evidence.
It was very
technical, and I must admit that I had some
difflculty following it at times. Who was better
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able to understand it? Judges, all of whom
have had university training and several years
of listening to expert witnesses, or jurors, who
might not have graduated from high school, and
who might be seeing the inside of a courtroom
for the fIrst time?
Crane:

But this case isn't typical. Most criminal trials
don't involve heavy scientific disputes. Most
turn on a rather simple question: who's telling
the truth and who's lying? A robbery victim
points to the defendant and says, "That's the
guy who robbed me," and the defendant testifIes
"I was home watching TV when the robbery
occurred." A diploma in biology isn't going to
help you fIgure out which one is right. And
there's no reason a judge should be any better
at it than a barber or a ballplayer.

Clare:

I'm not so sure about that.
Judges hear
defendants make up stories day in and day out.
Mter a while, they get a pretty good ear for it.
But some jurors are so naive they'll buy any
cock-and-bull story.

Crane:

And some judges always believe the cops-or
say they do, anyway. They have to work with
the police every day, and they want to stay on
good terms with them, especially if the judge is
looking for an appointment to the next court up.
Judges get more points for being pro-cop than
being pro-defendant. And as for defendants
making up stories, sure, some do. The judge
hears a few of these and then decides that all
defendants are probably lying. They get jaded.
That's why we need jurors.
They're not
prejudiced, and they bring a fresh look to
things.

Clare:

You mean they're more likely to fall for your
tricks. A lot of defense lawyers make a career
out of confusing jurors.

Crane:

Be nice to me, Ms. D.A. Without me, there's no
you. An adversarial system with only one
adversary is like the Dodgers showing up for the
World Series with no opponent. There's not
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much point to it.
Under this inquisitorial
system, we're both out of work.
Schmrz:

Not quite, but your roles would be substantially
diminished.

Clare:

That's true. I'd probably get more convictions
here, not having to deal with juries and
exclusionary rules and the like. But I wouldn't
have much to do with getting them. It wouldn't
feellike winning. Not as much fun.

Crane:

Hal The truth comes out. You like battling me.
See, we're both products of the adversarial
system. Maybe U.S. prosecutors have more in
common with U.S. defense lawyers than they do
with European prosecutors.

Clare:

Perish the thought. Anyway, Professor, I see
another problem with your view. Lots of times
the "truth" we are looking for isn't just a
"whodunnit." It involves values. The law says
that murder should be reduced down to
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed
because of some "reasonable provocation." So if
the defendant kills because the victim recently
molested the defendant's kid, we don't punish
him as much as we would a Mafia hit man. But
what a "reasonable" provocation is can be a
tough question. Is it reasonable when someone
says something racist to you? Is it reasonable if
someone raped you last week? This isn't a
question of "truth," it's a question of values.
Twelve jurors might bring the values of the
community into the decision better than one or
even three judges could.

Schmrz:

But such "values" are never considered by our
tribunals. These questions are decided by our
legislatures, not our courts. We expect courts to
apply the law, not to make it.

Clare:

Our judges make law all the time. And I guess
our juries also do it occasionally.
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Crane:

Jurors' experiences can be important even in a
whodunnit case. I once had a Latino client who
wouldn't look the judge in the eye when
testifying because he came from a countIy
where that was seen as a threat or an assertion
of dominance. And you just don't do that with
someone like a judge. The judge thought he was
lying. But some of the jurors were Latino and
knew about that, so they believed him, and they
acquitted him.

Clare:

I've had cases like that. Often twelve jurors
have had experience with life that no one judge
could have.

Crane:

You know, some judges never get out of the
courtroom. And when they do, they just hang
out in country clubs with their buddies, other
judges, a few doctors, and lawyers. They don't
know much about real life on the streets, where
most criminal defendants come from.

Schmrz:

I suppose the same might be said of some of our
judges.

Clare:

It's more of a problem in the United States than
here in Europe.
We have a very diverse
population, with racial and ethnic groups from
all parts of the world. In Los Angeles, we
probably have over fifty different language
groups, just in one city. And these people have
different cultures and customs. No single judge,
no matter how much he gets out in the world,
can possibly know as much about these
cultures as twelve jurors.

Grbzyk:

Perhaps our mixed tribunal obviates some of
these difficulties. Our lay assessors may bring
some real life into the tribunal's deliberations.

Clare:

Sort of a compromise, isn't it? You have the
benefit of professional judges running things,
but you also get input from the public, through
the lay assessors. Sounds like a good idea.
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Grbzyk:

Quite so. It satisfies both needs. Wouldn't such
a compromise be an improvement over your jury
system?

Crane:

Maybe, but as we saw in court today, it would
probably bring a lot of other changes along with
it. No more hearsay rules, no jury instructions,
no voir dire, and no peremptory challenges. And
judges telling jurors how to vote. That's a lot of
baggage to bring in just to get a mixed tribunal.

Clare:

Baggage, or benefits? Many people see those
things you mentioned as technicalities, well
worth getting rid of.

Crane:

Let's not overstate the amount of power our
jurors have. Granted, they deliberate alone,
without a judge with them, unlike the way you
do it. But we limit them in a way you don't.
Take that evidence of prior crimes which I tried
to keep out. Your lay assessors would hear this
evidence, and then in the deliberation room the
judge might try to talk them out of misusing it.
In our system, the judge would screen this
evidence, and keep the jury from even hearing it
at all if he felt it was only marginally relevant
and too prejudicial.

Schmrz:

Yes. I am quite struck by the amount of time
you spend in the United States on objections
and pre-trial motions involving whether jurors
will be allowed to hear certain evidence. It
seems to reflect a certain lack of confidence in
their ability to find the truth.

Grbzyk:

You know, this problem of fmding the truth is
not confmed to criminal cases. We deal with it
all the time in everyday life. An employer
discovers money missing from the petty cash
box. Does she just listen to the employee's
explanations, or does she try to fmd out the
truth herse1f7

Clare:

Obviously, the latter. Are you suggesting that
the inquisitorial system is more "natural" than
the adversarial system?
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Grbzyk:

Perhaps.

Crane:

It's more "natural" only if you see the state in a
paternalistic role. Maybe you Europeans see
the state as Big Daddy, but most in the United
States don't.

Schmrz:

Consider an institution many regard as quite
paternalistic, the Catholic Church. The Church
has had experience with both models when
judging whether certain people were worthy of
sainthood.
The Church initially used the
inquisitorial model, but this became too loose,
many
candidates
whose
sanctifying
qualifications were questionable.
So they
changed to an adversarial system, establishing
the office of Promoter of the Faith to argue
against any proponents of a particular
candidate.

Grbzyk:

The proponents called the Promoter the "devil's
advocate," didn't they?

Schmrz:

Yes. Each side had its lawyers, and the case
was tried before the Pope's representatives. It

worked quite well for several centuries. But the
whole process became so lengthy and
cumbersome that it was recently abandoned.
The process is now more inquisitorial.
Grbzyk:

What about scientists? Do they seek the truth
through an adversarial model, an inquisitorial
model, or neither?

Schmrz:

Probably through a blend of each. An individual
scientist may act as an unbiased inquisitor,
initially, but once he publicly proposes a new
thesis, the process might well become somewhat
adversarial, where he defends his thesis, other
scientists attack it, and the remaining scientific
community sits as the tribunal. It is a tribunal
of professionals, of course, not lay people.

Crane:

I think we're overlooking something here.
Finding the truth, whatever that is, is
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important. But it's not the only thing. We have
juries for other reasons as well.
Grbzyk:

Such as?

Crane:

Well, we talked earlier about how Americans
don't really trust government that much.
Criminal cases are about basic moral decisions,
what the morals of a community are all about.
Our communities want to be involved in making
those decisions. They don't want to leave it all
to the judges.

Grbzyk:

Don't they elect the legislators who enact the
criminal laws?

Crane:

Yes, but that's not enough. The laws are
abstract. A real case is concrete. It hits home.

Clare:

I'm just trying to imagine what it would be like
with no juries. People would probably think
that all these judgments, both convictions and
acquittals, were coming down from on high,
from the top. I can just see the accusations of
racism, sexism, classism, elitism, and other
"isms" flooding the newspapers. When people
see a case decided by fellow citizens, they are
more likely to accept it.

Crane:

Not always. Look at the riots resulting from the
Rodney King case, when a California jUlY
acquitted the white cops who beat up a black
man.

Clare:

True, but that was an aberration, an all-white
suburban jury trying a case that should have
been tried by a racially-mixed jury in Los
Angeles. That proves my point. If a mixed Los
Angeles jury had acquitted those cops, I don't
think the riots would have happened.

Schmrz:

Are you saying that even if your jury is more
likely to be mistaken than our judges, the jury
is still better because it makes the judicial
system and its rulings more acceptable to your
people?
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Clare:

Yes. Some things are more important than
being right all the time.

Crane:

And maybe we are saying only that it works
better for us. In Europe, your local populations
are not as diverse as ours. Perhaps it is less
important to have a cross-section of the people
deciding criminal cases. Maybe your judges are
not all that different from the rest of the
community, just a little better educated. So
your people are more willing to accept
judgments from judges.

Schmrz:

Europe is changing. We now have more mobile
populations, with more intermixing. So perhaps
our needs will become similar to yours. Our
crime rates are rising, and illegal drugs are
becoming more of a problem, as they have been
in your country for some time.
Italy is
changing, and it is also changing its legal
system. Maybe other countries will follow suit.

Crane:

I'm beginning to see why my question about
which system is better didn't make a lot of
sense. Maybe there is no "better." It all
depends on what a particular society wants and
thinks it needs.

Schmrz:

We see another problem with juries. It is very
important to us that the law be certain,
consistent, and predictable, and that our
officials be seen as having very little discretion.
As an institution, the jury runs counter to these
objectives. Because they are untrained novices,
jurors are quite unpredictable and they appear
to have wide discretion.
Allowing them to
return general verdicts, without explaining their
reasons, tends to confirm this.

Clare:

I'm not sure that using judges is much better.
True, an individual judge might be pretty
predictable. An experienced local lawyer can
usually tell you how Judge X will rule, if she's
been on the bench for a while. But the lawyer
will also predict that Judge Y will rule just the
opposite. This seems to make "the law" not very
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predictable. It all depends on which judge the
case is assigned to.
Schmrz:

That is not so much of a problem for us. As I
explained earlier, our judges are not selected for
their political philosophies. In addition, they
are all trained in the same way, they are

required to explain their decisions, and allowing
both sides to appeal tends to ensure that they
will follow the law. These features make judges

consistent with each other and with their own
prior rulings.
Clare:

The role of juries in U.S. law is important, but
let's not overstate it. Except in death penalty
cases, the jury usually has no say about what
sentence the defendant receives. That's for the
judge, and most of our jurisdictions do allow
both the prosecution and the defense to appeal
sentencing decisions. This helps to make the
sentencing more consistent and predictable.

Crane:

I'm trying to imagine what it would be like if our
juries did the sentencing. It could get pretty
wild. Each jury is made up of twelve different
people, most of whom have never decided a case
before. If the law gave them a lot of leeway in
sentencing, say one to ten years for armed
robbery, some juries would give one and some
would give ten.

Clare:

The same thing can happen with judges, as a
group. One judge might give one year, and
another ten. But at least a given judge will tend
to be pretty consistent.

Crane:

Right. If the case has been assigned to a
particular judge, the sentence becomes
somewhat predictable. That's very important for

plea bargaining. When I try to convince a client
to accept a deal, he wants to know what will
happen if he rejects the bargain and goes to
trial. If I can't give him a pretty good idea of
this, he's likely to take his chances and go to
trial.
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Clare:

So if sentencing were left to the jury, we'd
probably have fewer plea bargains and more
trials, which would require more resources.

Crane:

This all assumes, of course, that the legislature
allows leeway in sentencing. These days, a lot
of them don't.

Schmrz:

Does it also assume that you will continue to

bifurcate your trials, trying guilt and sentencing
separately?
Crane:

Yes. Even if we gave sentencing to the jury, we
couldn't give it to them at the same time as the
guilt issue. First, it would mean that evidence
relating to sentencing would come in, maybe
evidence of the defendant's prior criminal
lifestyle, and you just can't trust a jury to decide
guilt fairly when they've heard that stuff.
Second, it's just too confusing for a bunch of lay
people to decide more than one issue at a time.
It would take them forever to come back with a
verdict.
And if we required a unanimous
verdict, they'd probably never come back.

Clare:

Your system of combining the two issues in one
trial is probably more efficient than ours.

Schmrz:

Yes, but it works only because we have
professional judges deliberating with the lay
assessors. I agree with Mr. Crane. It would
never work if we used only the lay assessors.

Clare:

So maybe our jury system is really a
compromise. We use juries, for all the reasons
we discussed, but we limit their input to only
half the case: the question of guilt. They play
no part in the sentencing half, which is just as
important.

Crane:

With one exception.

Clare:

Yes, capital cases. There the penalty is so
extraordinary that we don't want the state to
impose it without the consent of the community,
at least twelve of its members.
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Grbzyk:

Your comments on the truth intrigue me.
Under your adversarial system, do lawyers want
the tribunal to learn the truth?

Clare:

I do. The truth is, the defendant is guilty.

Crane:

There's an unbiased opinion for you.

Clare:

Actually, it is. I spend a lot of time before trial
talking to witnesses and examining the physical
evidence. And I get to see a lot of evidence the
jury probably won't see, such as illegally seized
evidence and his prior record. These things
might persuade me that he's guilty even if the
jury later acquits him.
But if what I see
convinces ~e that he's innocent, I don't take the
case to trial. I dismiss it. I don't want to
convict an innocent man. So when I take a case
to trial, I know he's guilty. For me, that is the
truth.

Crane:

Very noble, Counsel. But you don't always
know someone is innocent or guilty. Suppose
you aren't sure. Suppose some guy is accused
of rape, he claims the woman consented, she
denies it, and you aren't sure who's telling the
truth. Do you take it to trial?

Clare:

That's a tough one. A lot depends on whether I
think I can get a conviction. I don't like to lose.
It maKes it harder for me to drive a tough plea

bargain if people aren't afraid that I'll win if the
case goes to trial. And losing isn't much of a
career booster, quite frankly. So if I think he's
guilty, . but I'm not sure the evidence shows it
beyond a reasonable doubt, I might dismiss or
plea bargain instead of trying it. I have enough
trouble rmding time to prosecute the guys I
know I can nail. I don't need to waste time with
weak cases.
Crane:

Don't dodge the issue. Suppose you have your
doubts, but you're getting political pressure to
prosecute-maybe from some women's group.
Do you go to trial?
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Clare:

My inclination is to leave it to the jury. That's
their job, not mine.

Crane:

A clever way of covering your rear end. If you
dismiss or plea bargain, the women's group will
say you sold them out. But if you go to trial and
lose, maybe they'll blame the jury and not you.

Grbzyk:

Let me make sure I understand you, Ms. Clare.
Even if you're not convinced he's guilty, in your
role as an advocate you argue that he is? You
try to persuade the jury that she's telling the
truth and he isn't?

Clare:

I guess I do. Once I get into trial, I want to win.

Grbzyk:

In our system, no prosecutor would argue that
the accused is lying if she did not in fact believe
that he was.

Clare:

When I get to trial, defense attorneys seem to
bring out the worst in me.

Schmrz:

What do you mean?

Clare:

When I ftrst look at a case, I'm very objective,
seeing all sides of it pretty fairly. At that point, I
might be willing to dismiss or settle. But as I

get closer to trial, I become more of an advocate,
and I hone down my arguments and my
rebuttals to my opponent's arguments. But the
odd thing is, I usually convince myself with my
arguments. Sometimes I look back on how I felt
when I ftrst saw the case, when I was very
dubious about it, and I can't ftgure out how I
became so sure that the case should come out
only one way. It's a strange transformation.
Crane:

It's not peculiar to prosecutors. It happens to
me too. It happens to all U.S. litigators, even in
civil cases. There's nothing wrong with it. It's
inherent in the adversary system. How can you
persuade a jury if they don't feel that you believe
what you're saying?

Schmrz:

So U.S. lawyers are all actors, pretending to
believe something they don't?
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Clare:

But you can't pretend.
The jury will see
through it. That's why you have to convince
yourself fIrst.

Grbzyk:

A peculiar psychological task, isn't it?

Crane:

It is, and a lot of people don't understand it.
They just think lawyers are liars, saying things
they don't believe just to win. It's not that

simple.
Clare:

Anyway, I don't feel so bad about it. Defense
counsel will urge the jury to acquit the
defendant, even when he knows the defendant
is guilty. He's certainly not out for the truth.

Schmrz:

I'm not convinced that either of you are out for
the truth. I happened to read some newspaper
reports which discussed some evidence that the
Accused may have become agitated by
something the victims did soon before the
killings. This would tend to show that he did
not premeditate the killing, which would have
reduced the crime to second degree murder. If
it showed a reasonable provocation, it might
even have reduced it to voluntary manslaughter.
And yet neither of you introduced this evidence.
Why?

Crane:

I took the position that the prosecution couldn't
prove that he even committed the killings. I
didn't want to confuse the jury with any
arguments that assumed that he did commit
them.

Clare:

I charged him with flrst degree murder. So
naturally I wouldn't want to put in any evidence
that detracted from that.

Schmrz:

So each of you, for different reasons, deceived
the tribunal, correct?

Clare:

That's putting it pretty strong. I think he
premeditated, so why should I help him by
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putting on evidence that tends to show that he
didn't?
Schmrz:

You think he premeditated, but isn't it the
tribunal's task to determine whether he did or

not? And you deprived it of the opportunity to
do so. This would never happen in our system.

The prosecutor has a duty to present all
evidence which is relevant to the case, no
matter which side it seems to help. The task of
the tribunal is to fInd the truth, not to decide
which side has presented the better case.
Crane:

I don't think I deceive the court when I don't put
on evidence I know about. It's not the job of a
defense attorney to help the court fmd the
truth. My duty is to my client. I can't tell him
to lie, and I can't put on false evidence. That
would be deceiving the court.

Schmrz:

A fme line, to be sure.

Crane:

Is it? Is it much different from refusing to plead
guilty when I know he's guilty? I do that when
the prosecution has a weak case. I just try to
poke holes in the prosecutor's case and hold her
to her burden of proving the case beyond a
reasonable doubt. If I succeed and get my client
off, I've done my job well, even if he is actually
guilty.

Schmrz:

So his guilt has no effect on you?

Crane:

I wouldn't say that. Like the prosecutor, I don't
like to lose. And if I lose at trial, my client's
sentence will be greater than it would be if I had
gotten him a decent plea bargain. So if the
prosecutor has a strong case, I'll probably
advise my client to bargain.

Clare:

Now who's dodging the issue? Suppose I have a
weak case, but you know your client is guilty.
You'll still urge the jury to acquit him. You
know it and I know it.

Crane:

Correct.
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Schmrz:

Morally, you have no problem with that, Mr.
Crane?

Crane:

Of course not. Look, I'm no different from any
other decent citizen. I don't want a rapist
running loose to threaten my wife or daughter.
As a citizen, I want this guy put away for a long
time if he did it. But as his lawyer, I want him
to walk.

Schmrz:

How can you want two inconsistent results?
And why put yourself in such a difficult
position?

Crane:

That's the same as asking me why I became a
lawyer. I did it because I believe in our system,
the adversary system. I think it works. Without
me, or someone like me, doing what I do, the
adversary system just couldn't work properly.

Schmrz:

Many people feel that U.S. criminal defense
lawyers are ... how should I say it?

Crane:

I'll say it for you.
We're greedy shysters,
manipulators, liars, out to. get mass murderers
off on technicalities, et cetera, et cetera. I've
heard them all.

Schmrz:

Do those accusations bother you?

Crane:

I don't mind heat. I get plenty of it from
prosecutors and judges, in court. That comes
with the territory. But it does bother me when
people don't understand how defense attorneys
contribute to the rendering of justice. Basically,
they just don't understand the adversary
system.

Schmrz:

Justice? Are you seeking justice when you urge
a jury to free a guilty man?

Crane:

See, that's the problem. You think my job is to
fmd a just result and urge the jury to come back
with that verdict. It isn't. Under the adversary
system, it's the system's job to come up with a
just result. That's not the job of each player in
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the system. Let's look at another player, the
bailiff. His job is to take care of the jury. But
he hears the evidence and arguments, and he
might come to his own conclusions. When he
escorts the jury into the deliberation room, is he
supposed to tell them what he thinks is the just
result? No way. That's not his role. Same with
me.
Schmrz:

So justice emerges from each player carrying
out his or her limited role?

Crane:

Yes, but only if every actor plays his role
properly. Clare's role is to prosecute, my role is
to defend, and the jury's rule is to decide who's
right. If I play her role, or she plays mine, or
either of us plays the jury's role, it doesn't work.
We're sort of like an automobile engine. The
pistons go up and down, the gears go from side
to side, and some of the rods even go
backwards. Everything seems to be going in a
different direction, but when all of them work
together properly, the whole car goes forward,
just where you want it to go.

Schmrz:

An attractive analogy, Mr. Crane. But the bailiff
is not actively trying to free a man who might be
guilty. You are. How can you expect the U.S.
public to look kindly on you?

Crane:

It's not easy. And we haven't done a very good
job of explaining to the public how we help
them. Look at it this way. There are two
possibilities, my client will either be convicted or
he'11 be acquitted. Either way, I help society. If
he's convicted, the fact that I tried hard to get
him acquitted lets us all sleep better, knowing
that it's very unlikely we are punishing an
innocent man, because I made sure the jury
knew every weakness in the prosecution's case.
And if my efforts help get him acquitted, we can
be sure we're not punishing an innocent man.

Grbzyk:

But sometimes your efforts have nothing to do
with guilt or innocence. When you urge the
court to exclude relevant evidence because the
police forgot to obtain a search warrant, or to
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exclude a confession because the police forgot to
read the defendant his Miranda rights, you seek
to prevent the jury from fmding the truth about
guilt or innocence. Aren't these the sorts of
technicalities the public complains about?
Crane:

Look, my job is to make the arguments for my
client, and that's all. I can't decide anything,
and I can't make the rules. That's the court's
job. If the public doesn't like the rules, they
should blame the courts and the legislatures,
not me. I'm just the messenger: I tell the court
when the rules have been broken.

Grbzyk:

That seems reasonable. But if people don't like
the rules, I suppose they'll blame the flrst
person that mentions them. You.

Crane:

Right. The basic problem is that people don't

appreciate why we have these rules.

The

exclusionary rule protects all of us from
unreasonable searches and arrests, and the
Miranda warnings make sure that the police
don't coerce defendants into confessing. You
can agree or disagree with these policies, but
you can't fairly call them "technicalities."
They're not like rules about what size paper
your briefs have to be written on; they deal with
fundamental rights. If they make it a little
harder to fmd the truth in some cases, it's well
worth the price.
I just wish the public
understood that.
Grbzyk:

The u.s. public sometimes sees the arguments
that lawyers present as rather fanciful.
Shouldn't you take responsibility for the
arguments you make?

Crane:

I should, and I do. All good lawyers make
creative arguments. The public doesn't realize
that lawyers in an adversarial system have to
push the envelope, to test the outer edges of the
rules. That's part of our job. If we didn't, the
law would never change, and we wouldn't be
representing our clients to the fullest. And don't
worry, if we cross the line between creative and
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fanciful, the judge won't hesitate to shoot us
down.
Schmrz:

Intellectually, you present a persuasive case,
Mr. Crane, as one might expect from an
intelligent lawyer. But let's talk about your
feelings for a moment.
I believe that's
fashionable in California these days. How do
you feel when a jury acquits a man you know to
be guilty?

Crane:

That doesn't happen often. But when it does, I
don't lose any sleep. I just make doubly sure
my doors are locked.

Schmrz:

So you feel content?

Crane:

Content? When I win, I feel terrific!

Schmrz:

The verdict reinforces your belief in the system,
I suppose.

Crane:

The system? When the jury walks through that
door with a verdict, who's thinking about the
system? Half the time, I'm not even thinking
about my clientl I'm thinking about one thing:

victory. A lawyer in the adversarial system is
like an athlete or a soldier, at least when we're
caught up in the emotions of a trial. Who would
think of asking a pro football player why he
wants to win the game? We're the same way.
I'm not sure whether we're born that way or the
adversarial system makes us that way, but
that's what happens.
Clare:

During trial, I feel the same thing. I might think
about the rights and wrongs of it all before the
trial begins, but once the judge bangs that
gavel, I just want to win. Period.

Schmrz:

Of course, winning is profitable for both of you,
is it not? Doesn't a good record enhance your
careers?

Crane:

Sure it does. That's how I get clients and she
gets promotions. But that's not what keeps us
going during a trial. Then we're warriors, not

1995J

THE O.J. INQUISITION

career climbers.
later.

1191

I'll balance my checkbook

Grbzyk:

Remarkable. I suppose this competitive drive is
what creates the drama we spoke of earlier.

Clare:

Yes. We are very competitive, and most of our
trial lawyers want to be Perry Mason, each in
their own way.

Grbzyk:

I don't think our lawyers have these feelings, at
least not to the degree you exhibit them.

Clare:

They don't know what they're missing. Say
what you will about the adversarial system, but
it sure is fun, at least for the lawyers.

Grbzyk:

Even when you lose?

Clare:

Of course not. But the thrill of winning makes
you forget your losses, 'til the next one, anyway.
It is pretty much like competitive sports, I
suppose.

Grbzyk:

We Europeans think competition is more suited
to the soccer field than our law courts. In the
United States, you seem to treat the quest for
justice as just a game.

Crane:

It's a game, all right, but it's not just a game.
The competitive spirit is the gas that makes the
car go.
It's the energy that drives the
adversarial system-a very good system, I might
add. It gets to the truth, most of the time, while
still serving other values we think are
important.

Schmrz:

Does it? How can you have such faith in a
system that might result in an acquittal of a
client you know to be guilty? Doesn't that show
that your adversarial system is faulty?

Crane:

Maybe it just shows that
Not necessarily.
humans aren't perfect. Until we develop an
infallible lie detector machine, we'll have to rely
on fallible people to decide whether other people
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are telling the truth. And they won't always get
it right. Do your judges always get it right?
Schmrz:

Probably not, but when the defendant
confesses, our judges are less likely to get it
wrong. And we do get more confessions than
you do.

Crane:

But look at how you get them. As I said before ...

Clare:

Please, Crane. Once is enough.

Crane:

Now wait a minute, Clare. I ...

Schmrz:

Pardon me for raising this, but I can't help
noticing a certain tension between you two. Do
you dislike each other?

Clare:

Not at all. Crane and I get along pretty well,
considering.

Schmrz:

Considering?

Clare:

Considering we're on opposite sides, of course.

Schmrz:

Opposite sides?
If Mr. Crane's analogy is
correct, you are both parts of the same
automobile engine, each working to move the
car forward towards the same destination: a just
result. Your goals are the same, aren't they?
Why should there be any animosity at all
between you?

Clare:

Good question. I guess when you represent the
same side over and over, you develop certain
attitudes about crimes and cops. I have mine,
he has his. And the two usually conflict.

Crane:

And don't forget the emotions we talked about.
When you get all worked up at trial a few times,
always on the same side, it tends to worm its
way inside you, and it stays there.

Clare:

True.
Also, different personality types are
attracted to one side or the other. Prosecutors'
offices tend to draw in people who are straight,
orderly types.
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Crane:

So I'm crooked and disorderly?

Clare:

Not necessarily. But you and your ilk do tend to
be more like rebels. You're not too likely to pick
prosecutors as your drinking buddies and viceversa.

Crane:

Conceded. We tend to distrust big government,
cops, and the establishment generally. You
don't. You wear pin stripes and wing-tips, and
we wear flashy ties and pony tails.

Grbzyk:

Could either of you switch sides?

Clare:

Me? Defend criminals?
years.

Crane:

Actually, I used to work as a prosecutor. But I
couldn't do it now.
I can't work for a
bureaucracy. I'm just not the organization-man
type. But I'm glad I did it. It taught me a lot
about how the opposition operates.

Schmrz:

The "opposition"-again. Is this healthy, this
loyalty to one side only? And is it necessary to
the adversarial system?

Clare:

I never really thought about it. How could it be
any different? You can't represent both sides.

Schmrz:

British barristers do. A barrister might be
retained by the prosecutor's office in one case,
and then by the accused in the next case. Some
tend to specialize in representing one side or the
other, but many take each case as it comes.
They are vigorous advocates in the particular
case, put it behind them when it is over, and
then become just as vigorous in the next case.
It works, and no one has suggested that it
diminishes the adversarial nature of British
practice.

Grbzyk:

Maybe the United States should try this.

Never in a million
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Crane:

Professor, didn't you warn me earlier against
comparing one feature of another system with

your own without looking at the whole system?
I know a bit about the Brits. They separate
their lawyers into solicitors and barristers.
Solicitors tend to work one side of the street:
either the prosecution or the defense, not both.
They prepare the case for trial, just like our
prosecutors and defense attorneys do. But then
the solicitor brings in a barrister as a trial
specialist to try it. So the lawyer with the most
contact with the client, the solicitor, sticks to
one side, just like our lawyers.
Grbzyk:

I stand corrected, Mr. Crane.

Clare:

Still, it's an intriguing idea, the more I think
about it. Maybe each of us would have a little
more respect for the other side if we took one of
their cases occasionally. We could try it out, in
some sort of test program.

Schmrz:

There is something else you might try: the
inquisitorial system. Some American critics of
your system have proposed this, believing that it
would be much more efficient. Some have even
pointed to the present case as an example of
how expensive and inefficient the adversarial
system can be.

Crane:

That might have had a chance a while ago, but
not now.

Schmrz:

Why is that?

Crane:

Sentencing. In recent years, our sentences have
gone through the roof. Mandatory minimums,
consecutives, three-strikes-and-you're-out, truthin-sentencing laws. It's getting worse all the time.

Schmrz:

I don't understand. I grant that your sentences

are much higher than ours, but why would this
preclude your adoption of the inquisitorial
system? What is the connection?
Crane:

Let's forget about the lawyers for a moment and
just think about the defendant. If you are

1995)

THE O.J. INQUISITION

1195

charged with a crime in the United States, the
prosecution is out to clobber you. They want to
put you in a miserable place for a very long
time, and sometimes they want to kill you. They
might have good reasons for this. I appreciate
people's frustrations about crime.
But
reasonable or not, it's clear that the prosecutors
are not looking after your interests, so you have
to do it yourself. It doesn't matter whether
you're guilty or innocent. You're going to resist;
it's human nature. And when you do, the
government is going to fight even harder. So
the system is inherently adversarial from the
start-with or without lawyers and judges. All

the lawyers and judges do is insist on some
procedures that make the fight a little more
civilized.
Clare:

Makes sense, I guess. But I don't see how this
explains the differences in systems. Doesn't the
prosecution always want the defendant
punished, even in the inquisitorial system?

Schmrz:

It depends on how you are using the word
"punish." When my child misbehaves, I punish
him in order to reform his behavior and make
him a better person, not to hurt him. I punish
him because I love him.

Clare:

Come on, Professor, tell the truth. When your
kid wrecks the furniture, you punish him
because you're angry at him, and also to cut
down the expense of buying new chairs, don't
you? It's not all just for him.

Schmrz:

I confess, those motives are also present, along
with the ones I mentioned. I want to help him,
and I am also annoyed and want to protect my
household. Is your decision to prosecute based
on the same mixture of motives?

Clare:

I guess not, at least for most major crimes. If
I'm going after an adult armed robber, I try to
satisfy my community's anger at people like
him, and I want him off the streets for as long
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as possible. Usually, I'm not trying to help him
at all.
Schmrz:

Will he receive any help in prison?

Crane:

Are you kidding?
Years ago, we tried to
rehabilitate prisoners: teach them to read and
learn a trade, so they might get a job when they
get out. In fact, rehabilitation was seen as one
of the main purposes of punishment. But today
people just want the two things Ms. Clare just
mentioned: to hurt the guy and to get him out of
the way. Any help he might get in prison is
incidental, and most of them get very little.

Clare:

I suppose it's true. Today, for most defendants,
the sentence he receives has little to do with any
notion of how long it might take to rehabilitate
him.
.

Schmrz:

You say "most." Are there exceptions?

Clare:

Sure. If I have a young defendant without much
of a record, I might give him a break, maybe get
him into a diversion program to help him break
a drug habit, or recommend a suspended
sentence on condition he behaves himself and
gets a job. If I don't have an angry victim
pushing me, I might try to help him.

Grbzyk:

This is the approach the inquisitorial system
takes with almost all defendants. Perhaps I
would not go so far as to say that we hurt them
because we love them, as Professor Schmrz does
his child. But we start \vith the assumption
that they are redeemable.

Schmrz:

Not all of them, of course. Terrorists who kill
innocent people probably evoke the same
response in our community that the average
burglar does in yours.

Clare:

Are you telling me that your defendants think
the state is trying to help them by prosecuting
them, so they don't have much incentive to
fight?
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Schrorz:

I wouldn't go quite that far, but I would say this.
The average robber would not feel that a state
that fmes him or sentences him to four or six
months in prison hates him, even if it does not
love him. On some level, he might believe that
he did wrong and deserves some loss of freedom
for a while. But if the state were to imprison
him for ten years for the same crime, he might
think that depriving him of a substantial part of
his life was much more than just desserts.

Crane:

It's worse than that. A ten-year sentence is
society's declaration that he is worthless, that
he has no chance for redemption, that his
community does hate him. While a six-month
sentence might conceivably reform him, there is
little chance that a ten-year sentence will do so.
He has effectively been declared an outcast for
the rest of his life. He'll never see this as for his
own benefit, and he won't take it without a
fight. Any system that threatens him with this
will necessarily be an adversarial system.

Grbzyk:

Ms.

Clare, you mentioned your occasional

sympathy for young offenders.

Wasn't your

juvenile court system built on similar premises?
Clare:

Yes. It was intended to punish juveniles like
you punish your child: to protect society and to
help the kids grow up to be good citizens. There
was supposed to be an element of love in it, sort
of.

Grbzyk:

Did this approach affect the way juvenile court
trials were handled?

Clare:

Yes.
They were set up to be pretty
nonadversarial. No juries, no defense lawyers,
and relaxed rules of evidence. The kid didn't
need those things to protect him, because the
court was out to help him, not to hurt him.

Crane:

That was the idea, but it didn't work out that
way. Kids were thrown into miserable detention
homes, which were like jails, and often their
"sentences" were set according to what they had
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done, not what they needed. It began to look so
much like adult court that our Supreme Court
required states to give them some of the same
rights that adult defendants get, like defense
lawyers. It became an adversarial proceeding
because the state was trying to punish them,
not help them. If the proceeding is based on
hostility rather than concern, it will always be
adversarial.
Schmrz:

So, I see why you said that the nature of the
sentence may affect the nature of the
adjudicatory system.

Crane:

Yes. Earlier, I compared a U.S. adversarial trial
to a baseball game. Maybe for the lawyers it is.
To us, it's mainly a game-a big game, but still a
game. But the defendant has much more at
stake. For him, it's more like a bullfight. The
matador is trying to kill the bull, and the bull is
fighting for his life. That's the essence of it.

You can change the weapons, the costumes, or
the players. You could even give the bull a
lawyer. But if they're still trying to kill the bull,
the adversarial nature of the contest won't
change. The bull will never quietly accept an
"inquisitorial" decision that he should die. He'll
always fight back.
Schmrz:

The bull is innocent, of course.

Crane:

True, but that doesn't matter much. Even a
guilty bull, or a guilty defendant, will resist
when his enemy is trying to take his life or a
substantial part of it. And he should. Even if
you're guilty, that doesn't mean you deserve the
penalty they're trying to inflict on you.

Schmrz:

How would your bull-defendant react to an
inquisitorial system, if the United States were to
adopt it?

Crane:

I can just imagine me telling him, "Joe, I won't
bother cross-examining the key witnesses
against you, because we can depend on the
judge to try to get to the truth. You should just
get up there and confess. Don't worry, you can
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trust the prosecutor and the court to look out
for your interests." He'd say, "Counselor, are
you nuts? Those guys are trying to put me
away for twenty years. That is not in my
interests, no matter what I did. If you won't
fight back for me, I'll get a lawyer who will."
See, the inquisitorial system just doesn't mesh
with the high sentences.
Grbzyk:

Are these harsh sentences wise? I understand
that your communities are concerned about
crime, but they might do more to stop crime if

they

directed

their

efforts

more

toward

rehabilitation?
Clare:

Rehabilitation is pretty tough to do. When you
punish your child, you can do a lot to see that
the punishment helps him, or at least doesn't
hurt him, because you control most of his life.
You make sure that he is well-fed and housed,
that he does his homework, and develops a good
character and work habits. You have some say
over the company he keeps. The punishment
might help him, because the rest of his life is in
good shape.
That's just not true of most
criminal defendants in the United States. They
live in rough neighborhoods where they hang
out with criminals, they go to lousy schools, and
they often have bad home situations.
A
prosecutor can't do anything about this.
Neither can the judge, and neither can the
prison warden.
We can't take "the whole
person" and help him the way you help your
kid. So we punish to help us, not to help the
defendant. That's all we can do.

Schmrz:

In our villages, or in neighborhoods of our cities,
there are often support systems that enable us
to help wayward offenders, even adults.
COUldn't your society do something to change
the conditions you describe?

Clare:

Maybe we could, but we don't.

Those are

political questions that are much larger than
the question of whether we should have an
adversarial or inquisitorial legal system. Some
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voters think we should do more for the poor,
and others think it's hopeless or too expensive
to try, and they're too angry with criminals to
care about helping them. Right now, the second
group seems to be having its way. But whatever
the people decide, we in the legal profession are
stuck with their decisions. We're just the tail,
not the dog. Our criminal legal system is a
symptom of how those larger political questions
are handled. At the moment, U.S. prosecutors
can't help the defendant much. So we try to
hurt him. And when we do, he fights back.

Schmrz:

Does it follow that you must give him the tools
to fight with, like defense lawyers and juries?

Crane:

It does follow. When you have a lot of cops and

prosecutors trying to hurt people rather than
help them, some are bound to make mistakes
and commit abuses. So the defendant needs
protections.
You can't allow an aggressive
prosecution without giving the defendant the
power to defend himself.
Schmrz:

Is there a consensus on that point among your
citizens?

Crane:

In the abstract, I'm not sure. But when just one
case of serious injustice hits the newspapers,
like an innocent guy getting railroaded, most
people do insist that protections be built into
the system.

Clare:

Same thing happens on the other side. If just
one man gets off or gets out and commits
another serious crime, the public demands that
we change the whole way we deal with criminal
cases.

Crane:

Yes. We've been talking as if our system is
based on a careful weighing of all the things
we've been talking about. But often we set

policy by sound bites.

Maybe that's why we

sometimes seem so erratic. Somebody commits
a crime the public sees as particularly heinous,
and some politician gets a lot of mileage by
pushing an increase in the penalty for that
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crime. Over time, this happens with several
crimes, and gradually that changes the
standard. So the sentences for all crimes get
ratcheted up, even though we never sat down
and decided that this would be a good idea for a
coherent system.

Grbzyk:

In Europe, where prosecutors are not so
aggressively seeking long sentences, there is not
as much need for protections for the defendant,
which make up the heart of your adversarial
system.

Crane:

Right.
Until we change to a sentencing
approach that shows more Goncem for the
defendant, I don't think we can change to an
inquisitorial-type system.

Clare:

But that doesn't mean we can't consider
adapting certain features from the inquisitorial
system that might improve our adversarial
system.

Crane:

Like what?

Clare:

Well, for example, we might ....

A young man comes up to Grbzyk and whispers in his ear.

Grbzyk:

A fascinating question, but we must defer it to

another day. Now, we should return to court.
The tribunal is ready to announce its judgment.
They all rise and begin walking.
Schmrz:

. So, my friends, you have learned much about

our inquisitorial system?
Clare:

Yeah. Thanks for the tips. But the funny thing
is, something else happened, something I never
expected.
By looking at your system and
comparing it with ours, I picked up some
insights into our system. I've been an American
lawyer for quite a while, and I thought I knew
our system inside out. I do, in a way, but I've
been so busy climbing the trees that I never had
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a good look at the forest. I just took juries,
hearsay rules, and opponents like Crane for
granted, without seeing how it all fit together. I
guess a goldfish doesn't know what her bowl
really looks like until she gets out and sees
another bowl.

Crane:

It's been an eye-opener, all right. I thought
things like the jury trial, the exclusionary rule,
and the privilege against self-incrimination were
engraved in stone, like the Ten Commandments.
They're not. You can have a just and civilized
legal system without them. You do, and you
don't seem to be savages, except for your coffee.
Americans view those things as fundamental
rights because ....

Clare:

Just because they're American.

Grbzyk:

And we do the same. We accept and expect
certain features just because of who we are.

Schmrz:

But people change. And when they do, maybe
they can learn from other cultures.

All exit, into the courthouse.
-CURTAIN-

